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I. INTRODUCTION
“How she realized at last that not even love could justify this, that no
affection could, not ever.  Still, in the glass, she sees her own mouth,
opening and closing and silent as a fish.”1
Laura Aceves was only twenty-one years old when she made her
final frantic call to the police for help.2  “No one else would have done
this,” Laura told police as she received the news that someone poured
bleach in her gas tank.3  Standing on the side of the road alone, Laura
was helpless as she watched her car break down from the actions of
her abusive ex-boyfriend, Victor Acuna-Sanchez.  However, despite
Laura’s persistent pleas for help, the police officers were unable to
find Victor, who was out on bail awaiting trial for felony aggravated
assault.4  Two days later, Laura died from a gunshot wound to her
head.
Although Laura was two years older than Victor and had two chil-
dren from a previous relationship, the couple began dating almost im-
mediately after meeting at a friend’s birthday party in 2011.5  From
1. ZOË BRIGLEY, CONQUEST (2012).
2. Melissa Jeltsen, This is How a Domestic Violence Victim Falls Through The
Cracks, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/06/16/domestic-violence_n_5474177.html, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/GXC9-WL98.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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the beginning, Victor was violent, beating Laura on a weekly basis
and subjecting her to “a harrowing cycle of harassment.”6  Deeply con-
trolling, Victor burned Laura’s passport, social security card, and
birth certificate in an effort to ensure she could never leave him.7
When Laura attempted to flee, Victor knew how to find her, and would
destroy her possessions until she returned.  Finally, after becoming
pregnant with Victor’s child, Laura received a temporary restraining
order against Victor.8
Unfortunately, Laura’s subsequent attempts to leave the abusive
relationship were met with violence, threats, and destruction, and all
were unsuccessful.  Discouraged, Laura refused to seek a permanent
restraining order, and the abuse escalated after the birth of Victor’s
child.9  Victor proceeded to beat and strangle Laura, smash her car
with a hammer, destroy the baby’s car seat, and steal her belong-
ings.10  Although Victor was arrested and charged with aggravated
assault, the court granted him bail and placed him on probation.11
Victor never checked in with the probation office despite orders to call
twice a week.12  Furthermore, in violation of the no-contact order is-
sued upon his arrest, Victor forced Laura to ride in a vehicle with
him.13  While the police arrested Victor for this violation, the judge
released Victor on his personal recognizance.14  “That was the last
time he was in police custody while Laura was still alive.”15
On Christmas day, Laura informed Victor that she was leaving
town.  Allegedly, Laura had saved enough money to rent an apart-
ment in Missouri with a friend.16  On New Year’s Eve, police discov-
ered Laura dying on the floor of her apartment.  She didn’t make it to
the New Year.  Police arrested Victor at his mother’s home hours
later, where they found him hiding in the shower with a .22-caliber
handgun, thirty-nine bullets, and the key to Laura’s apartment.17
Although tragic, Laura’s story is not unique.  On average, forty-six
American women are shot to death each month at the hands of men
they love.18  Of all female homicide victims, approximately thirty-
three percent are killed by an intimate partner, and this rate of do-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Linda McFadyen-Ketchum, Supreme Court Must Protect Victims of Domestic Vio-
lence, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
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mestic homicide is steadily increasing.19  When examining deaths by
firearms specifically, over two-thirds of females are murdered by inti-
mate partners.20  The mere presence of a gun in a relationship
plagued by domestic abuse increases this risk of homicide by a factor
of six.21  It is therefore undeniable that “[b]eing shot by an intimate
partner is the most common cause of intentional death of women in
this country.”22
Despite the prevalence of domestic violence in America, and the
brutality inflicted upon the victims, perpetrators are typically only
charged with misdemeanors—if they are charged at all.  The most
common punishments include probation, a suspended sentence, or,
rarely, imprisonment, which cannot exceed one year.23  Conviction of
com/linda-mcfadyenketchum/supreme-court-must-protect-victims-of-domestic-vio
lence_b_4602303.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/56F4-M2PR.
19. EVE S. BUZAWA ET AL., RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE INTEGRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN SERVICES 25 (4th ed. 2012); see Domestic Violence,
NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/images/Na
tional_Domestic_Violence_Statistics.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/XB45-NF8W.
20. Amy Karan & Helen Stampalia, Domestic Violence and Firearms: A Deadly Com-
bination, 79 FLA. B.J. 79, 79 (2005); Laura Finley, Guns and Domestic Violence: A
Lethal Mix, PEACE VOICE (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.peacevoice.info/2013/10/03/
guns-and-domestic-violence-a-lethal-mix/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
7ND6-4Q26.  In 1996, approximately sixty-five percent of intimate partner homi-
cides were committed using a firearm.  Thomas J. Leroe-Muñoz & Shabnam
Roohparvar, Federal Domestic Violence Law, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 311, 320
(2007).  This figure has been estimated to be as high as seventy percent in previ-
ous years. See Charles M. Watts Jr., The Lautenberg Amendment: Should the
Federal Government be Required to Notify State Governments and Citizens when
it Enacts a Malum Prohibitum Criminal Law Whose Punishment is a Felony Re-
sulting in Extended Incarceration?, 12 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 234, 236 (2000).
21. Amy Barasch, Why Give Violent Domestic Abusers a Gun?, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2014,
6:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/01
/supreme_court_hears_castleman_this_insane_suit_would_give_guns_to_domes
tic.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/W2H2-EFYR.  Some studies estimate
that the presence of a gun can increase the risk of homicide twenty-fold after an
incident of domestic violence has occurred. See Babak Lalezari, Domestic Vio-
lence: Enough is Enough, Any Force is Enough, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 295, 295
(2008).
22. Barasch, supra note 21; see Polly M. Pruneda, The Lautenberg Amendment: Con-
gress Hit the Mark by Banning Firearms from Domestic Violence Offenders, 30 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 801, 803 (1999) (stating that “incidents of gun-related domestic vio-
lence . . . are not uncommon in the United States”).
23. See also Jamie Doward, Teesside Judge Far Too Soft on Domestic Abusers, Say
Three Police Commissioners, GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.
com/society/2014/oct/18/teesside-judge-far-too-soft-on-domestic-abusers-say-
three-police-commissioners, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/FZ8V-WX7K (ques-
tioning the leniency certain judges apply in domestic violence cases); Samantha
Pidde, Man Granted Suspended Sentence in Domestic Abuse Case, CLINTON HER-
ALD (Sept. 20, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://www.clintonherald.com/news/article_337
d81c6-40e0-11e4-a1e0-1bd25c776144.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
Q27E-863G.
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a misdemeanor carries no firearm prohibition, and is often expunged
from a perpetrator’s record upon completion of a domestic batterer’s
course or psychological counseling.  This legal framework has proved
devastating for domestic violence victims, given that at least half of
domestic violence defendants who murder their partners have crimi-
nal histories and legal access to firearms.24
Recognizing the lethal connection between intimate partner vio-
lence and homicide, Congress enacted the Domestic Violence Offender
Gun Ban in 1996.  Frequently referred to as the Lautenberg Amend-
ment, after the late Senator Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ), the legisla-
tion prohibits any individual convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence from purchasing or owning a gun.25  With the pri-
mary purpose of “sav[ing] the life of the ordinary American woman,”
the Lautenberg Amendment sought to close a dangerous loophole in
gun control laws by keeping firearms away from violent individuals
threatening their families.26  Thus, the Lautenberg Amendment acts
as a preventive measure by attempting to “target deadly abuse before
it happens.”27
Although well-intentioned, the Lautenberg Amendment has been
subject to conflicting interpretations that have limited its effective-
ness.  In particular, courts have disagreed over whether an offense
must involve violent physical force to qualify as a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence.  This confusion existed for almost two decades
before the United States Supreme Court intervened to clarify the stat-
utory requirements in March 2014.  In a unanimous opinion, the
Court held that any application of physical force against a domestic
partner could satisfy the requirements for a misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence.28  The force need not be violent or excessive.  More
specifically, this requirement of “physical force” is expressly satisfied
by the degree of force supporting a common law battery conviction.29
24. See Maria Kelly, Domestic Violence and Guns: Seizing Weapons Before the Court
Has Made a Finding of Abuse, 23 VT. L. REV. 349, 363 (1998).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2014).
26. Gaylynn Burroughs, Supreme Court Will Decide on Re-Arming Domestic Abusers,
MS. MAG. (Jan. 16, 2014), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2014/01/16/supreme-court-
will-decide-on-re-arming-domestic-abusers/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
C3F7-ASWV; see Abigail Browning, Domestic Violence and Gun Control: Deter-
mining the Proper Interpretation of “Physical Force” in the Implementation of the
Lautenberg Amendment, 33 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 273, 279 (2010).
27. Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Firearms Ban, 14 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 6 (2005).
28. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1413 (2014).
29. See Luke Rioux, How Domestic Violence Convicts Might Get Their Guns Back:
Castleman & Armstrong, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 10, 2014), http://contrib
utors.pressherald.com/news/harmless-error/how-domestic-violence-convicts-
might-get-their-guns-back-castleman-armstrong/, archived at http://perma.unl.
edu/WYL4-4GYB.
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By interpreting the physical force requirement broadly, the Supreme
Court received widespread praise for taking an active stance against
domestic abuse.30
While the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman
is emotionally appealing, it is precedentially erroneous and offers lit-
tle practical assistance to domestic violence victims.  This Article ex-
plores the faulty reasoning espoused by the Supreme Court in arriving
at its activist decision, and illustrates the minimal impact this opinion
will have on the lives of female victims.  Specifically, this Article high-
lights the low prosecution rates under the federal firearms ban and
explains why proposed legislative initiatives will be unsuccessful in
appreciably reducing domestic abuse.  In support of these arguments,
this Article is divided into five parts.  Part I provides a detailed over-
view of domestic violence, including the lethal interaction of domestic
violence and firearms.  This section further details the history of legal
remedies and the rise of judicial action against domestic violence.
Part II offers a succinct overview of the Lautenberg Amendment, ex-
ploring the legislation’s passage and purpose.  Part III then highlights
the circuit split regarding the type of physical force necessary for an
offense to qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, and
resolves this disagreement by summarizing the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing and reasoning in Castleman.  Part IV then transitions into an in-
formative analysis and argues that the Supreme Court’s ruling visibly
departs from precedent.  This section also challenges the effectiveness
of legal responses to domestic violence and articulates why upcoming
legislative proposals are similarly flawed and ineffective.  As a rem-
edy, this section advocates early proactive intervention in the form of
educational programs, and further offers strategic advice for prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys to heighten success at the plea bargaining
table.  Finally, Part V concludes the Article.
II. FISTFUL OF LOVE: UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
Domestic violence is a universal constant plagued by an ever-evolv-
ing definition.  For aggressors, domestic abuse is a method of “keeping
women in their place, literally confined to relationship, household, or
30. See, e.g., Lynn Rosenthal, Supreme Court Decision in U.S. v. Castleman Will Save
Women’s Lives, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 28, 2014, 2:23 PM), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/blog/2014/03/28/supreme-court-decision-us-v-castleman-will-save-womens-
lives, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9HYU-V4H5 (describing the Court’s deci-
sion as “a landmark opinion” that “will save women’s lives”); SCOTUS Bolsters
Domestic Violence Gun Ban, HASTINGS WOMEN L.J. (Apr. 18, 2014), http://has
tingswomenslj.org/journal/2014/4/8/scotus-bolsters-domestic-violence-gun-ban-1,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/CTC8-ZCHD (“[T]his decision has already been
dubbed landmark and critical in the crusade to end domestic violence across the
United States.”).
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family structures defined by patriarchal authority.”31  As an ongoing
strategy of intimidation and isolation, domestic violence represents an
extreme and persistent attempt to control a partner’s behavior.32
While the legal conception of this abuse focuses heavily on physical
battering, the reality is a compound mixture of emotional, psychologi-
cal, verbal, and physical torment that occurs in a repeated cycle.33
Domestic violence thus centers on the principles of power and control,
and “cuts across all racial, economic, social, and sexual preference
backgrounds.”34
Although both men and women commit acts of domestic abuse, in-
timate partner violence is the leading cause of injury to women in the
United States.35  Over eighty-five percent of domestic violence victims
are female, and this abuse results in more than 18.5 million mental
health care visits each year.36  An estimated 1.3 million women have
been physically assaulted at the hands of an intimate partner, and one
in every four women will experience domestic violence in her life-
time.37  With regards to physical abuse, recent estimates indicate that
between twenty-two and thirty-five percent of emergency room visits
are due to injuries sustained from physical abuse.38  Given this data
and the prevalence of domestic violence, women are much more sus-
ceptible to abuse inside the home than in any other place.39  The prob-
31. JONI SEAGER, THE PENGUIN ATLAS OF WOMEN IN THE WORLD 28 (4th ed. 2009).
32. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 75 (noting that domestic violence “is the logical
outcome of a continuum of conduct centered on a pattern of coercive controls es-
tablished by a dominant partner”).
33. See Sharon L. Gold, Why Are Victims of Domestic Violence Still Dying at the
Hands of Their Abusers?  Filling the Gap in State Domestic Violence Gun Laws,
91 KY. L.J. 935, 938–39 (2003) (explaining that domestic violence occurs in
phases called the Cycle Theory of Violence).
34. Id. at 937.
35. Leroe-Muñoz & Roohparvar, supra note 20, at 312; Lynn D. Wardle, Marriage
and Domestic Violence in the United States: New Perspectives About Legal Strate-
gies to Combat Domestic Violence, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 791, 794 (2003); Watts
Jr., supra note 20, at 236.
36. Domestic Violence, supra note 19.
37. Id.
38. Albert R. Roberts, A Comparative Analysis of Incarcerated Battered Women and a
Community Sample of Battered Women, in HELPING BATTERED WOMEN: NEW PER-
SPECTIVES AND REMEDIES 31 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1996); Wardle, supra note 35,
at 794; see Diane C. Dwyer et al., Domestic Violence and Woman Battering: Theo-
ries and Practice Implications, in HELPING BATTERED WOMEN: NEW PERSPECTIVES
AND REMEDIES 75 (“Battering is the single most common cause of emergency room
treatment for women and the major antecedent of injury to women, leading to
approximately 25 percent of female suicide attempts and 4,000 homicides per
year.”).  In any given year, approximately one million women will seek medical
treatment for injuries received from a domestic partner.  Joshua M. Jones, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and the Circuit Split: The Case for a Broad Definition of Do-
mestic Violence, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 82 (2009).
39. SEAGER, supra note 31, at 28; When Men Murder Women: An Analysis of 2011
Homicide Data, VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER, http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2013.
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lem of domestic violence is thus a ubiquitous constant for women
worldwide and is more accurately categorized as an epidemic.40
A. You Knocked the Love (Right Outta My Heart):
Explaining Domestic Abuse
Despite the universal nature of domestic abuse, the term “domestic
violence” lacks a conclusive definition.41  The characterization and in-
terpretation of domestic violence alters with the changing social con-
structs, and denotes a spectrum of behaviors committed by intimate
partners.42  Including both physical and non-physical behavior, do-
mestic violence encompasses ridicule, name-calling, excessive moni-
toring of the partner, verbal threats, stalking, spitting, scratching,
biting, grabbing, punching, kicking, choking, rape, sexual coercion,
and death.43  Abusive intent is the dominant theme in these domestic
attacks, and even minor physical contact constitutes domestic vio-
lence.44  Because batterers can change tactics over time, domestic
abuse is a fluid and dynamic process in which no two experiences are
identical.  Accordingly, the reality of domestic violence differs for each
individual, making a comprehensive definition of the term
impractical.
While the spectrum of acts constituting domestic violence is vast,
the pattern of abuse typically follows a predictable cycle and escalates
in severity over time.45  According to the Cycle Theory of Violence de-
veloped by Lenore Walker, violent relationships comprise three dis-
tinct phases.46  During Phase I, the Tension-Building Phase, the
abuser exerts control over the victim through minor battering inci-
pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RV35-LPK5
[hereinafter Men Murder Women].
40. Gold, supra note 33, at 937; see SEAGER, supra note 31, at 28.
41. Wardle, supra note 35, at 792.
42. See VENESSA GARCIA & PATRICK MCMANIMON, GENDERED JUSTICE: INTIMATE PART-
NER VIOLENCE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2011) (“Society’s definitions
of intimate partner violence have always been dependent on the social constructs
of the day.”).
43. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 65
(2000) (explaining that domestic violence includes “a continuum of sexual and
verbal abuse, threats, economic coercion, stalking, and social isolation”); see also
MANDY BURTON, LEGAL RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC Violence 3 (2008) (“The violence
may include physical, emotional and financial abuse.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Gold, supra note 33, at 937–38 (describing incidents of physical and
psychological abuse, including name calling, taunting, pinching, biting, slapping,
and public humiliation).
44. See Dwyer et al., supra note 38, at 68 (stating that domestic violence is the result
of “intentional, hostile, and aggressive physical or psychological acts”).
45. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1408 (2014).
46. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55–71 (1980) (describing the Cy-
cle Theory of Violence).
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dents.47  The principal form of abuse at this stage is verbal and emo-
tional, including accusations, putdowns, and insults.48  In return,
“[t]he battered woman tries everything to prevent the impending vio-
lence, but the tension inevitably escalates into a violent episode.”49
During these episodes, the attacker becomes oppressive while the vic-
tim assumes a passive role in an attempt to appease her abuser.50
The victim eventually experiences feelings of helplessness, and the
tension reaches an unbearable climax.51
As a direct result of this buildup and climax, the abuser erupts into
violence in Phase II, the Acute Battering Incident.52  The violence in-
creases in severity from minor incidents to unstoppable rage, and can
result in physical injury.53  The victim is extremely vulnerable at this
stage, and feels psychologically trapped.54  This vulnerability, in turn,
perpetuates the dangerous environment, making this the most likely
stage for serious physical injury.55  This phase lasts between two and
twenty-four hours and is the shortest phase of the cycle.56
Finally, following the battering incident, the victim and abuser
enter Phase III, the Honeymoon Stage.  The abuser becomes nourish-
ing and kind, apologizes for his abusive behavior, and promises it will
never happen again.57  Seeing a glimpse of the man she fell in love
with, the victim tries desperately to believe the abuser, and feels re-
sponsible for his behavior and welfare.58  The batterer’s empty
promises and kindness convince the victim to stay in the abusive rela-
tionship, and reinforce the abuser’s perception of control.59  As this
third phase concludes, the cycle repeats, with the Honeymoon Stage
becoming shorter and shorter.60
47. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not
Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 222 (2002); Gold,
supra note 33, at 938.
48. Theories About Abuse: The Cycle Theory of Battering, TRANSITION HOUSE, http://
www.transitionhouse.ca/THEORY.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/U724-VH2K [hereinafter Cycle Theory of Battering].
49. Gold, supra note 33, at 938.
50. Alison L. Weitzer, The Revitalization of Battered Woman Syndrome as Scientific
Evidence with the Enforcement of the DSM-5, 18 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 89, 99
(2014).
51. Cycle Theory of Battering, supra note 48.
52. Id.
53. Gold, supra note 33, at 938.
54. Weitzer, supra note 50, at 99.
55. Cycle Theory of Battering, supra note 48.
56. Gold, supra note 33, at 938.
57. Id. at 939; Cycle Theory of Battering, supra note 48.
58. Cycle Theory of Battering, supra note 48.
59. Gold, supra note 33, at 939; see Jerry von Talge, Victimization Dynamics: The
Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family Violence Directed Toward Women
and the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 111, 145–46 (2000).
60. Cycle Theory of Battering, supra note 48; see Gold, supra note 33, at 939.
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As the relationship deteriorates throughout this cycle of violence,
between fifty and ninety percent of battered women attempt to leave
their abuser.61  These efforts are frequently frustrated by the abuser’s
violent response and the economic deprivation that accompanies sepa-
ration.62  Moreover, a period of heightened abuse can be triggered by
ending the dating relationship, physical or legal separation, or di-
vorce.63  The abuser comprehends these acts as threatening his con-
trol over the victim, and may seek to regain his power through more
violent abuse or killing.64  Thus, regardless of whether a victim stays
in the relationship or leaves, her experience with domestic violence “is
terrifying and debilitating, and can rob her of all manner of trust, se-
curity, and hope.”65
B. But Earl Walked Right Through That Restraining Order:
Legal Responses to Domestic Violence
In light of the negative emotional, physical, and psychological ef-
fects domestic violence produces, women seeking to flee abusive rela-
tionships routinely turn to the legal and law enforcement systems for
protection.  Domestic disturbance calls constitute the largest category
of complaints received by police departments annually,66 and officers
witness assaults in approximately one-third of those disturbances.67
However, despite the victims’ pleas for help, the legal definition of do-
mestic violence has been substantially informed by the “conception of
women as subordinated through force and the threat of force,” and
thus focuses disproportionately on physical abuse.68  This limited
spotlight restricts police and legal intervention, and employs an inci-
dent-based, rather than a control-based definition of domestic vio-
lence.69  As such, victims whose abuse falls outside these bounds are
61. Kelly, supra note 24, at 354.
62. Id. “Domestic violence is cited as the primary cause of homelessness in many
cities because victims who leave their abusers often have nowhere to go.”
MICHELLE L. MELOY & SUSAN L. MILLER, THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN: LAW,
POLICIES, AND POLITICS 122 (2011).
63. Carrie Chew, Domestic Violence, Guns, and Minnesota Women: Responding to
New Law, Correcting Old Legislative Need, and Taking Cues from Other Jurisdic-
tions, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL’Y 115, 116 (2003).
64. Id. at 116–17; see SEAGER, supra note 31, at 30 (“Violence against women often
escalates when the woman tries to leave an abusive relationship—this is when
violent partners are most likely to turn to murder.”).
65. Rosenthal, supra note 30.
66. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 (2006).
67. Adam W. Kersey, Misdemeanants, Firearms, and Discretion: The Practical Im-
pact of the Debate over “Physical Force” and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1901, 1924 (2008).
68. LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 3 (2012).
69. Kelly, supra note 24, at 357.
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denied legal and judicial assistance, and prior incidents of violence
tend to be concealed.70
The development of this passive legal framework traces its origins
to the historical conception of domestic violence as a private, familial
affair.71  Interspousal immunity and the law of coverture granted a
man authority over his wife’s possessions and body, and “created a
legal atmosphere that condoned domestic violence as a husband’s tool
for maintaining control over this ‘property,’ referring to his wife.”72
This attitude remained pervasive throughout the United States for de-
cades and furthered the notion that familial violence was beyond the
law’s reach.73  Shielded by this perception of privacy, violations
against women became legally devalued as a function of gender
stratification.74
In particular, the first law criminalizing domestic battery in the
Western world was not passed until 1641.75  Enacted by the Puritans
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, this law primarily served a symbolic
function and was rarely enforced.76  Legal remedies building on this
initial statute occurred across the United States in waves, and “re-
flected the fact that violence in the private sphere was viewed more as
a threat to social order than as injury to individual victims.”77  Specifi-
cally, these new legal responses showcased concerns about immigra-
tion, industrialization, and urbanization, and sought to both control
and limit the behavior of “dangerous classes.”78  Female victims filing
complaints for abuse under these laws faced extreme reluctance by
70. See id.
71. Eric A. Pullen, Guns, Domestic Violence, Interstate Commerce, and the
Lautenberg Amendment: “[S]imply Because Congress May Conclude that Particu-
lar Activity Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce Does Not Necessarily Make
It So.,” 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1045 (1998) (“Historically, domestic violence has
been viewed as unfortunate private behavior by society and is designated non-
criminal by the justice system.”); see also Chew, supra note 63, at 120 (analyzing
Minnesota laws on domestic abuse); Dwyer et al., supra note 38, at 68 (“Protected
by the privacy of the family, the institution of marriage has been viewed as a
license to abuse.”).
72. Leroe-Muñoz & Roohparvar, supra note 20, at 313; see BUZAWA ET AL., supra note
19, at 54 (“Ancient historical precedents can therefore best be summarized by the
concept of the natural inferiority of women, the natural authority of the male
head of the household, and at its extreme, the ‘property’ rights of the head of the
household over everyone in his domain.”).
73. Leroe-Muñoz & Roohparvar, supra note 20, at 313–14.
74. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 5.
75. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 56; MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 39.
76. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 39; see SCHNEIDER, supra note 43, at 14 (not-
ing that Puritans preferred to reconcile couples when there were complaints of
abuse). Between 1633 and 1802, only twelve cases of battering were ever brought
in Plymouth Colony. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 57; GARCIA &
MCMANIMON, supra note 42, at 70.
77. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 39.
78. Id. at 39–40.
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the police and prosecutors to mete out justice.79  These officials be-
lieved any adverse action against the husband would be detrimental
to the female’s economic situation.80  Even when charged and con-
victed, however, batterers escaped with either impunity or a small
fine.81
Legal decisions reflecting societal tolerance and ambivalence to-
ward domestic violence continued throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury.82  It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that the stage for modern
feminism was set.83  Beginning in the 1960s, the battered women’s
movement gained traction, arising from the relentless work of femi-
nists, activists, and battered women themselves.84  Focusing prima-
rily on the justice system’s response to abused women, activists
challenged the handling of domestic violence cases within the existing
legal framework.85  Drawing unparalleled attention to the problem of
domestic abuse, feminists initiated a shift away from victim blaming
and sparked a system-wide critique of governmental and judicial com-
plicity in matters of interpersonal violence.86  Specifically, individuals
began questioning the allocation of state resources, and developed a
deepened public concern for victims and social inequalities.87  Victim
advocates worked diligently during this time to expose inadequate
criminal justice practices that failed to protect victims and hold of-
fenders accountable.88  Thus, from the beginning, activists high-
lighted the importance and centrality of legal change to the battered
women’s movement.89
Unfortunately, by the mid- to late-1970s, “it became apparent that
formal legal modifications were not enough to guarantee actual
change in the official response to woman battering.”90  Police officers
continued to espouse a “hands off” policy, and were extremely reluc-
tant to arrest male abusers.91  Trained to act as mediators, police of-
ficers encouraged parties to “work it out” and removed the abuser
79. Id. at 39.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 40.
82. Lisa A. Frisch & Joseph M. Caruso, The Criminalization of Woman Battering:
Planned Change Experiences in New York State, in HELPING BATTERED WOMEN:
NEW PERSPECTIVES AND REMEDIES 104.
83. See id. at 107.
84. Id.; see Chew, supra note 63, at 120.
85. See Frisch & Caruso, supra note 82, at 109.
86. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 8.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 9.
89. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 43, at 44.
90. Frisch & Caruso, supra note 82, at 111.
91. Chew, supra note 63, at 120.
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temporarily so he could “cool off.”92  These officers perceived interper-
sonal conflict as unsuited for police attention and inappropriate for
prosecution.93  As “gatekeepers of the criminal justice system,” and
the first point of contact for victims, police officers’ failure to intervene
nullified judicial reform and prevented victims from accessing legal
remedies.94  Activists quickly realized that “victims were the forgotten
piece of the criminal act,” and sought to alter the frontline responses
to domestic violence.95
One of the first problems activists encountered was the inability of
police officers to arrest an abuser for misdemeanor assault unless it
was committed in the officer’s presence.96  This limitation required
passage of stronger arrest policies, specifically in the form of pro-ar-
rest statutes for domestic violence incidents.97  Implementation of a
pro-arrest policy enhances an officer’s ability to make a warrantless
arrest where the officer has not witnessed the assault.98  Such policies
further limit or remove police discretion over which abusers to arrest.
The extent to which an officer’s discretion is restricted depends on
whether the policy implemented is one of mandatory arrest or pre-
sumptive arrest.  Mandatory arrest policies completely eliminate an
officer’s choice where there is probable cause to believe that domestic
violence has occurred, while presumptive arrest policies strongly
guide the officer’s use of discretion.99  Mandatory arrest is favored by
individuals who believe policy pronouncements in favor of arrest are
insufficient to change an officer’s response to domestic abuse.100
These individuals further recognize that officers may lack sufficient
domestic violence training to effectively respond to and analyze a do-
mestic situation.101  By removing an officer’s free will, mandatory ar-
rest policies ensure that all victims of domestic abuse receive equal
and adequate treatment, and subject domestic abuse to “the harsh
light of community scrutiny.”102  However, regardless of whether the
92. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 41; see GOODMARK, supra note 68, at 84
(“[T]he most common police response to a ‘domestic call’ was to advise the hus-
band to take a walk around the block and cool down.”).
93. Chew, supra note 63, at 120; see GARCIA & MCMANIMON, supra note 42, at 90
(“Throughout most of the twentieth century the classic police response to intimate
partner violence was to avoid a dangerous and unpleasant situation by spending
as little time as possible with these calls in order [to] engage in ‘real police
work.’ ”).
94. See MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 40; GARCIA & MCMANIMON, supra note 42,
at 87.
95. See MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 15.
96. Id. at 41.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 191; SCHNEIDER, supra note 43, at 184.
100. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 191.
101. Id. at 192.
102. GOODMARK, supra note 68, at 108.
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policy is mandatory or presumptive, the pro-arrest attitude attempts
to force a change in police behavior without first altering police
attitudes.103
Armed with stronger police intervention, activists next sought to
revamp the prosecution of domestic violence cases.  “Prosecution was,
if anything, rarer than arrest” in domestic abuse incidents and prose-
cution rates were “ridiculously low” prior to the late-1980s.104  How-
ever, with the reconstruction of intimate partner violence as a
widespread social problem, prosecutors began implementing no-drop
policies.105  No-drop policies permit prosecutors to pursue domestic vi-
olence cases without the cooperation of the victim.106  Under these
policies, victims do not have to face their abusers, and prosecutors rely
on other evidence to satisfy their burden of proof.107  This lack of vic-
tim testimony makes prosecution possible when victims become unco-
operative during the criminal process.108  Sometimes called evidence-
based prosecution, the triumph of these no-drop policies thus depends
on successful interaction and collaboration between the prosecutor
and police.109  While no-drop policies have been criticized for depriv-
ing victims of control over their relationships, they have nonetheless
been credited with sending a strong message that domestic abuse will
not be tolerated.110
In addition to no-drop policies, judicial branches began the wide-
spread adoption of statutes and policies encouraging judges to issue
injunctive orders and grant civil remedies to victims of abuse.  Histori-
cally, the power to issue an injunctive order was considered ancillary
to the court’s substantive power of interpreting law and facts.111
“Since the issuance of a protective order was not the court’s primary
purpose, judges have [traditionally] used injunctive orders spar-
ingly.”112  However, since the 1980s, temporary restraining orders
(TROs) and other injunctive devices have become some of the most
103. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 192.
104. GOODMARK, supra note 68, at 86.
105. GARCIA & MCMANIMON, supra note 42, at 61.
106. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 43; GARCIA & MCMANIMON, supra note 42, at
115.
107. GARCIA & MCMANIMON, supra note 42, at 115.  Other evidence can include 9-1-1
tapes, photographs, medical records, information gathered by social workers, tes-
timony by witnesses to the abuse, and statements made to medical personnel
concerning injuries. Id. at 116.
108. Id. at 115; see MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 42–43.
109. GARCIA & MCMANIMON, supra note 42, at 115.
110. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 43.
111. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 277.
112. Id.
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frequently used legal remedies for battered women.113  These legal
mechanisms forbid the abuser from contacting, harassing, stalking, or
injuring the victim.114  While judges retain complete discretion over
whether to grant a TRO, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
have now enacted laws providing victims of domestic abuse access to
courts through these injunctive devices.115  It is estimated that be-
tween 600,000 and 700,000 permanent restraining orders are entered
annually based on TROs and injunctive orders.116
An immense benefit of the protective order is that it affords the
judicial system an opportunity for prospective intervention in cases of
domestic abuse.  Any violation of a protective order results in auto-
matic criminal liability, and avoids the necessity of requiring proof of
past abusive conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.117  These orders fur-
ther serve as a means of documenting abusive incidents, and consti-
tute evidence should a case reach prosecution and adjudication.118
Moreover, “because violation of an order is now a criminal offense in
all states, the existence of the order itself provides a potent mecha-
nism for police to stop abuse.”119
Unfortunately, despite the benefits of protective orders, such rul-
ings are only worth the paper they are written on.  Police officers face
significant obstacles attempting to enforce these orders of protection,
and the effectiveness of this remedy has been relegated solely to the
responsibility of law enforcement.120  However, police officers have no
constitutional obligation to enforce victims’ injunctive orders.121  Fur-
ther supporting this notion of elusive enforcement is the fact that
abusers contact approximately seventy-five percent of victims despite
permanent no-contact orders.122  Studies have also associated protec-
113. Albert R. Roberts, Court Responses to Battered Women, in HELPING BATTERED
WOMEN: NEW PERSPECTIVES AND REMEDIES 97 [hereinafter Roberts, Court
Responses].
114. Id. at 98.
115. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 279; Leroe-Muñoz & Roohparvar, supra note 20,
at 314.
116. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 279.
117. Id. at 284; see Roberts, Court Responses, supra note 113, at 98 (“If the batterer
violates any of the conditions of the protection order . . . he will be in contempt of
court or guilty of either a misdemeanor or criminal offense.”).
118. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 44.
119. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 284.
120. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 44; Roberts, Court Responses, supra note 113,
at 98; GARCIA & MCMANIMON, supra note 42, at 189 (noting that effective protec-
tion for victims of domestic violence requires police involvement and a willing-
ness to enforce the orders).
121. See generally Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
122. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 295; GARCIA & MCMANIMON, supra note 42, at
124 (stating that over fifty percent of domestic violence protection orders are vio-
lated); Wardle, supra note 35, at 799 (claiming that fifty to sixty percent of all
protective orders are violated within one or two years).
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tive orders with increased violence and homicide, and there is typi-
cally little to no police intervention.123  Regardless of these facts,
however, civil protection orders are invaluable for the role they play in
empowering victims of abuse.
Understanding this evolution of legal responses to domestic vio-
lence, it is unsurprising that the legal framework today is reactive and
confined in nature.  Although modern domestic violence can result in
at least seven forms of legal action—civil protection orders, criminal
prosecution, civil action for damages, divorce, custody disputes,
spousal/child support, and actions against third parties—these reme-
dies have limited effectiveness in actually preventing domestic
abuse.124  Many prosecutors continue to assign a low priority to do-
mestic violence cases, especially those that require victim testimony
and lack concrete physical evidence.125  This emphasis on prosecuting
only successful domestic violence cases “is at odds with the reality of
intimate-partner assault, which is often a series of incidents that may
reflect increasing seriousness, with little physical evidence and no wit-
nesses.”126  Additionally, the no-drop policy strips the victim of control
over her situation, and increases reluctance by victims to report
abuse.127  Of the cases that are successfully reported and prosecuted,
most incidents are charged as misdemeanors, preventing offenders
from building criminal histories that would influence an assessment of
future dangerousness.128  As such, domestic abusers are still not pri-
oritized by the judicial system in the same manner as felons.  Given
the prevalence of plea bargaining, most offenders receive light
sentences, little jail time, and have the conviction expunged from their
record after completion of a domestic violence program.  Thus, “[a] bat-
tered woman, upon confronting legal structures impermeable to her
stories, learns that the criminal law does not go to the places of her
suffering.”129
C. If I Die Young: The Link Between Domestic Violence and
Homicide
The legal system’s failure to adequately address domestic violence
can produce deadly results.  Because domestic violence offenders are
either acquitted or prosecuted under misdemeanor statutes, they are
123. GOODMARK, supra note 68, at 88.
124. Wardle, supra note 35, at 795, 800.
125. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 43.
126. Id. at 44.
127. Id. (“In sum, the reactive nature of the system means that many victims of inti-
mate-partner violence do not ever come to the attention of legal authorities be-
cause they are reluctant to report the abuse.”).
128. Id.
129. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Renewing the Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An
Assessment Three Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613, 624 (2007).
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not subject to the same restrictions as felons with regards to purchas-
ing and owning firearms.130  In fact, half of the defendants who kill
their spouses have criminal histories, typically in the form of misde-
meanor abuse convictions.131  Given the escalating nature of domestic
violence, providing a convicted abuser with access to firearms is not
only dangerous, it’s lethal.132
Every month, forty-six women are shot and killed by an intimate
partner.133  Between 2001 and 2012, more women were murdered as a
result of domestic violence than the number of soldiers killed in both
Iraq and Afghanistan.134  In 2005 alone, 678 women and 147 men
were fatally shot by their intimate partners in the United States.135
More recently in 2011, “there were 1,707 females murdered by males
in single victim/single offender incidents,” and ninety-four of these vic-
tims knew their killers.136  Nationwide, firearms were the predomi-
nant weapon of choice in nearly two-thirds of all intimate partner
murders.137  This excessive use of guns in femicide is unique among
industrialized nations, and American women are eleven times more
likely to be murdered with a firearm than women in other high-in-
come countries.138
130. See Jones, supra note 38, at 97 (stating that arrest rates for domestic violence are
as low as one out of every 100 acts of domestic abuse).
131. Kelly, supra note 24, at 363.
132. Burroughs, supra note 26; see Elizabeth Albright-Battles, Fix the Law to Protect
Women, GAZETTE (July 30, 2014), http://thegazette.com/subject/opinion/guest-col
umnists/fix-the-law-to-protect-women-20140730, archived at http://perma.unl.
edu/9KZK-Z2LY (“When we see innocent woman after innocent woman gunned
down by abusive boyfriends and husbands, it becomes clear how badly our laws
fail to protect our women.”).
133. Leigh A. Caldwell, Domestic Violence: The Next Front in Gun-Control Fight, CNN
(July 30, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/30/politics/domestic-violence-and-
guns, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/H62Y-CEHJ; see also Michele Richinick,
Senate Holds First-Ever Hearing on Guns and Domestic Violence, MSNBC (July
30, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/senate-holds-first-ever-hearing-guns-
and-domestic-violence, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8AY3-AMYP (noting
that forty-eight women are shot to death by intimate partners each month).
134. Caldwell, supra note 133; see Lauren Fox, In Gridlocked Congress, Guns Are
Back, U.S. NEWS (July 29, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/
29/senate-hearing-takes-on-domestic-violence-and-guns, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/3TFL-3HWS (claiming that more than 6,400 women were killed between
2001 and 2012 as a result of domestic violence).
135. United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 166 (4th Cir. 2011); see also United States
v. Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 868 (S.D.W. Va. 2010) (placing the cumulative
number of victims shot and killed in 2005 as a result of domestic violence at over
800).
136. Men Murder Women, supra note 39, at 3.
137. DAVID ADAMS, WHY DO THEY KILL? MEN WHO MURDER THEIR INTIMATE PARTNERS
256 (2007); see also Barasch, supra note 21 (“Guns are the most common weapon
used in intimate partner homicides.”).
138. ADAMS, supra note 137, at 256; McFadyen-Ketchum, supra note 18.
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Additionally, the mere presence of a gun in a domestic assault situ-
ation increases the risk of death between seven- and twenty-fold.139
The risk of homicide is further heightened where the abuser has previ-
ously threatened to kill or harm the victim with a weapon.140  Faced
with these daunting and realistic threats, women sometimes turn to
firearms for protection against the abuser.  However, “[w]hile two
thirds of women who own guns acquired them primarily for protection
against crime, the results of a California analysis show that purchas-
ing a handgun provides no protection against homicide among women
and is associated with an increase in their risk for intimate partner
homicide.”141  Similar reports found that women murdered at the
hands of an intimate partner were more likely to have purchased a
handgun in the three years prior to their deaths.142  These studies
cast doubt on the longstanding notion of firearm protection, and illus-
trate the dangerous reality of handgun possession in an abusive
relationship.
Moreover, although the rate of domestic violence murder has de-
creased by forty percent from 1970 to 2000, the killing of female vic-
tims has only moderately decreased from 1,600 per year to 1,300.143
Paradoxically, it is the number of male victims that has decreased
dramatically over this period, from 1,400 to 500.144  Thus, despite the
overall decrease in domestic violence homicide, female victims remain
at-risk and vulnerable.
III. LOVE WITHOUT TRAGEDY: THE LAUTENBURG
AMENDMENT ATTEMPTS TO SAVE WOMEN’S LIVES
Recognizing the lethal interplay between domestic abuse and fire-
arms, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg sought to close a dangerous loop-
hole in the federal Gun Control Act that allowed convicted domestic
abusers to possess guns.145  Proposed as a nationwide solution, the
139. Watts, Jr., supra note 20, at 236 (“In homes where guns are present the overall
risk of homicide being committed by a family member or intimate partner is
seven times greater than in homes where guns are not present.”); Lalezari, supra
note 21, at 295 (placing the increased risk of homicide at twenty-fold with the
presence of a firearm); see also Karan & Stampalia, supra note 20, at 79 (stating
that “[h]ouseholds with guns are almost eight times more likely to involve a fire-
arm homicide by a family member or intimate acquaintance than homes without
guns”).
140. Chew, supra note 63, at 118 (noting that previous threats with a weapon increase
the risk of death five-fold).
141. Men Murder Women, supra note 39, at 1 (internal citations omitted).
142. Id. at 1–2.
143. ADAMS, supra note 137, at 4.
144. Id.
145. See Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 528
n.8 (2003) (“Speaking in support of the Lautenberg Amendment, Senator Frank
Lautenberg stated that, ‘[t]here is no question that the presence of a gun dramat-
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Lautenberg Amendment supplemented the federal felon-in-possession
law and extended the firearm ban to individuals convicted of misde-
meanor crimes of domestic violence.146  Specifically, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9) makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence “to ship or transport in interstate
or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm
or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”147  A
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in turn, is defined by 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) as having two elements.  First, the offense
must be a recognized misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal
law.148  Second, the offense “must have, as one of its own elements,
the use or the threatened use of physical force committed against an
individual with whom the person is in a domestic relationship.”149  A
domestic relationship includes a current or former spouse, parent or
guardian of the victim, an individual with whom the victim shares a
child in common, or a person who is cohabitating with or has cohab-
ited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian.150  Through
these statutory provisions, the Lautenberg Amendment acknowledges
the reality that less severe forms of domestic abuse may evolve over
time into homicide, and attempts to mitigate the special risks associ-
ated with this escalation by curbing firearm access.151  Thus,
§ 922(g)(9) creates a permanent firearms disability for domestic vio-
lence misdemeanants.152
When faced with a Lautenberg Amendment case, the court must
examine the conceptual elements of the predicate offense to determine
whether the crime requires the use of physical force.153  As such, the
ically increases the likelihood that domestic violence will escalate into murder.’”)
(citation omitted); see id. at 529–30 (“The strong evidence of a link between do-
mestic abuse and gun-related violence has led Congress to enact two statutes
prohibiting domestic abusers from possessing firearms.”).
146. John M. Skakun III, Violence and Contact: Interpreting “Physical Force” in the
Lautenberg Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1833, 1833–34 (2008).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012).
148. Id. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2014); see, e.g., United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 16
(1st Cir. 2011); Tanjima Islam, The Fourth Circuit’s Rejection of Legislative His-
tory: Placing Guns in the Hands of Domestic Violence Perpetrators, 18 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 341, 344 (2010).
149. Islam, supra note 148, at 344 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)); see, e.g.,
Booker, 644 F.3d at 16; Skakun III, supra note 146, at 1833 (noting that any
crime possessing the requisite relational element and use of physical force can
qualify as a predicate offense).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
151. See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 1411, 1457 (2005) (“The firearms ban is designed to prevent the escalation of
violence in domestic situations by taking firearms out of the hands of abusers.”).
152. See Lininger, supra note 145, at 548.
153. Skakun III, supra note 146, at 1836.
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facts underlying predicate offenses are irrelevant, and whether an in-
dividual is actually dangerous is never considered.154  Instead, courts
employ a categorical approach in which the charging papers are con-
sulted to determine under which element(s) of the offense the defen-
dant was convicted.155  The defendant must have been charged under
a statute involving the use of physical force for the conviction to qual-
ify.  However, misdemeanor crimes typically do not explicitly require
the use of “physical force.”156  As such, the court must determine if
physical force is an implicit element of the offense.157  “To be an im-
plicit element, ‘physical force’ must be ‘a constituent part of the of-
fense which must be proved by the prosecution in every case to sustain
a conviction under a given statute.’”158  Therefore, if the offense can-
not be committed without using physical force, then physical force is
an implicit element of the crime.  Such force typically manifests in as-
sault and battery convictions.159
Additionally, to sustain a Lautenberg conviction, the crime must
have been committed against a domestic partner.  Although this rela-
tional element appears straightforward, the Fourth Circuit created a
judicial split when it required the domestic relationship to be a statu-
torily specified element of the predicate offense.160  Prior to the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hayes, federal courts con-
sistently rejected the argument that § 922(g)(9) mandated an explicit
domestic relationship element.161  In arriving at this conclusion, the
courts afforded substantial weight to the plain language of the
Lautenberg Amendment and Senator Lautenberg’s intent to target
widespread domestic abuse.162  Particularly, courts noted that requir-
ing a relational element would “lead to a significant practical anom-
aly” and “frustrate the clear purpose behind the law,” which
contemplated extending the firearm ban to any person convicted in
any court of domestic violence.163  Because fewer than half the states
include relationship status as an element in a misdemeanor domestic
154. Id. at 1835.
155. Id. at 1836–37.
156. Id. at 1838.
157. Id.
158. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
159. See, e.g., Skakun III, supra note 146, at 1852 (“Assault and battery are the core
predicate crimes necessary to implement this idea—if abusers are convicted of a
misdemeanor, as a matter of common sense it is likely to be assault or battery.”).
160. See United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 555 U.S. 415
(2009); Lalezari, supra note 21, at 296.
161. Jones, supra note 38, at 86; see, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354,
1365–66 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 220 (1st Cir.
1999).
162. Islam, supra note 148, at 346.
163. Meade, 175 F.3d at 220.
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assault offense, the Lautenberg Amendment’s effectiveness would be
severely limited by the Fourth Circuit’s approach.164
Agreeing with this rationale, the United States Supreme Court
confirmed that a domestic relationship need not be an explicit element
of the predicate offense.165  Section 921(a)(33)(A) uses the world “ele-
ment” in the singular, thus implying that Congress conceived of only
one element in the requisite offense—use of physical force.166  “Had
Congress meant to make the [offender’s relationship with the victim]
an element of the predicate offense, it likely would have used the plu-
ral ‘elements,’ as it has done in other offense-defining provisions.”167
Additionally, a contrary outcome would be “awkward as a matter of
syntax,” requiring the Court to read the language “the use or at-
tempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon” as a phrase modified by the clause “committed by.”168  A per-
son, however, cannot “commit” a “use,” but rather “commits” an “of-
fense.”169  Thus, the Court determined that an offense qualifies as a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence if it has, as an express ele-
ment, the use of force or attempted or threatened use of a deadly
weapon.  The relationship requirement need only be part of the facts
giving rise to the offense, not an element of the offense.170
Following a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence, the Lautenberg Amendment operates as a self-executing sanc-
tion that requires the criminal to relinquish his weapons.171  Refusal
to turn over firearms is punishable by up to ten years in prison and a
$250,000 fine.172  For a conviction to qualify, however, the defendant
must have been represented by counsel and tried by a jury, unless the
individual knowingly and intelligently waived these rights or volunta-
rily pleaded guilty.173  A defendant who appeals his conviction is still
subject to the firearm ban until the conviction is vacated or over-
turned.174  Absent this relief, there is nothing a convicted abuser can
164. Id.
165. Hayes, 555 U.S. at 421–22, 462.
166. Id. at 421.
167. Id. at 421–22.
168. Id. at 422; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).
169. Hayes, 555 U.S. at 422–23.
170. See Lalezari, supra note 21, at 296.
171. Mikos, supra note 151, at 1419; see Lininger, supra note 145, at 548 (explaining
that only convictions, not indictments, trigger the Lautenberg Amendment).
172. Lininger, supra note 145, at 550.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i) (2012); Karan & Stampalia, supra note 20, at 80.
174. See Major Einwechter & Captain Christiansen, Abuse Your Spouse and Lose
Your Job: Federal Law Now Prohibits Some Soldiers from Possessing Military
Weapons, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1997, at 25, 27 (“If a previous conviction has been
expunged or set aside, or if the person has been pardoned or accorded a full resto-
ration of civil rights by the proper authority, the disability is removed.”).
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do to lift the firearm ban.175  The ban is also retroactive, applying to
convictions both before and after the law’s enactment.176  In this man-
ner, the Lautenberg Amendment “picks up the slack left by state laws”
that allow domestic violence crimes to be plea bargained to lesser
offenses.177
Despite its laudable goal, passage of the Lautenberg Amendment
was far from uncomplicated.  Senator Lautenberg originally intro-
duced the bill on March 21, 1996.178  As proposed, the bill was
straightforward and prohibited firearm possession by any person who
had committed a “crime involving domestic violence.”179  The bill did
not, however, “include any language requiring that certain ‘elements’
be present in the state statutes defining the predicate offense.”180
Critics argued that the term “crime of violence” was overbroad, as it
could include mundane acts such as destroying credit cards or docu-
ments with scissors.181
After extensive compromise and alteration, Senator Lautenberg
sought to incorporate his bill into the Anti-Stalking Act.  The Anti-
Stalking Act passed the House of Representatives without the
Lautenberg Amendment in late May 1996.182  However, Senator
Lautenberg blocked a vote on the Anti-Stalking Act in the Senate un-
til his proposed amendment was integrated.183  The sponsor of the
Anti-Stalking Act, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX), refused,
expressing concern that the Lautenberg Amendment’s controversial
content would prevent the Anti-Stalking Act from becoming law.184
On July 25, 1996, after implementing additional changes, the legisla-
tion was incorporated into the Anti-Stalking Act by voice vote.185
175. Mikos, supra note 151, at 1439.
176. Kelly, supra note 24, at 364; Pullen, supra note 71, at 1062.
177. Jodi L. Nelson, The Lautenberg Amendment: An Essential Tool for Combatting
Domestic Violence, 75 N.D. L. REV. 365, 378 (1999).
178. Kerri Fredheim, Closing the Loopholes in Domestic Violence Laws: The Constitu-
tionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), 19 PACE L. REV. 445, 446 (1999); Melanie C.
Schneider, The Imprecise Draftsmanship of the Lautenberg Amendment and the
Resulting Problems for the Judiciary, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 505, 510 (2008).
179. Lininger, supra note 145, at 551; see also Lalezari, supra note 21, at 311–12
(“When the Lautenberg Amendment was originally proposed, it used the broader
term, ‘crime of violence,’ rather than the enacted version’s ‘use of physical force’
language.” (citation omitted)).
180. Lininger, supra note 145, at 552.
181. Id. at 554. But see Lalezari, supra note 21, at 312–13 (stating that Senator
Lautenberg believed the credit-card-cutting scenario was farfetched, and that the
statute would not be applied in that manner).
182. Pullen, supra note 71, at 1036.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Fredheim, supra note 178, at 446; Schneider, supra note 178, at 510; Lininger,
supra note 145, at 552–53.
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Following numerous delays with the Anti-Stalking Act, Senator
Lautenberg reoffered his amendment in a last minute maneuver to
the 1997 Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government appropri-
ations bill.186  Unfortunately, after twenty-five hours of debate, Re-
publican Senator Trent Lott removed the legislation from the floor
over disagreements on health care.187  Prior to its removal, however,
the Senate overwhelmingly approved the Lautenberg Amendment by
a vote of 97 to 2.188  Finally, on September 28, 1996, Senator
Lautenberg successfully initiated his third attempt and attached the
legislation to the 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act—a
federal budget bill necessary to prevent a government shutdown.189
Many in Congress were unaware of the amendment’s existence due to
Senator Lautenberg’s decision to dispense with reading the bill’s
text.190  As a result, neither the House nor the Senate held hearings
on the Lautenberg Amendment, and there was no opportunity to dis-
cuss its constitutional ramifications.191
Despite its limited legislative history, the Lautenberg Amendment
has withstood repeated constitutional challenges in federal courts.
Such attacks have occurred on multiple fronts, including the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s notice and fair warning provi-
sion, the Due Process Clause, and the Tenth Amendment’s guarantee
of state sovereignty.192  Additionally, critics condemn the law “as an
overreaching of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, as an imper-
missible Bill of Attainder, and as an impermissible restriction on the
right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment.”193  Fed-
eral courts, however, have dismissed these arguments, and found the
Lautenberg Amendment to be a constitutional use of Congress’s Com-
merce Clause powers.194  In particular, courts note that § 922(g)(9)
186. 142 CONG. REC. S11877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lautenberg);
Pullen, supra note 71, at 1037; Schneider, supra note 178, at 510–11.
187. Pullen, supra note 71, at 1037; Schneider, supra note 178, at 511.
188. 142 CONG. REC. S11877; Pullen, supra note 71, at 1037.
189. Schneider, supra note 178, at 511.
190. Pullen, supra note 71, at 1037–38.
191. Id. at 1037.
192. May, supra note 27, at 11; see, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319,
322–24 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the Lautenberg Amendment does not vio-
late either the Ex Post Facto Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment); United States v. Lewitzke, 176 F.3d 1022, 1025–28 (7th Cir. 1999)
(denying a challenge to the Lautenberg Amendment on the basis of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
193. May, supra note 27, at 11 (citations omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203, 215–21 (5th Cir. 2001) (analyzing challenges to the Lautenberg
Amendment under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Com-
merce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Second Amendment).
194. Elizabeth Coppolecchia et al., United States v. White: Disarming Domestic Vio-
lence Misdemeanants Post-Heller, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1505, 1507 (2010) (“Sec-
tion 922(g)(9) contains specific language that connects the provision to interstate
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contains specific language requiring the firearm be possessed “in or
affecting commerce” or received after having “been shipped or trans-
ported in interstate or foreign commerce.”195  This language sets the
Lautenberg Amendment apart from predecessor firearm and domestic
violence legislation, which lacked this jurisdictional element.196
In addition to these constitutional challenges, the Lautenberg
Amendment has faced extreme criticism for its universal applicability
to all individuals, including law enforcement officers, government em-
ployees, and military personnel.197  The lack of exemption for police,
government, and military officers makes the Lautenberg Amendment
different in kind and degree from the Gun Control Act of 1968, which
excused these officials from the firearm ban.198  Particularly, the Gun
Control Act allowed police and military officers to retain their fire-
arms as part of their employment, even if convicted of a crime of do-
mestic violence.199  However, the Lautenberg Amendment prohibits
these same individuals from possessing weapons, even if such weap-
ons are a necessary component of their job.200  As such, the
Lautenberg Amendment supersedes the Gun Control Act’s public in-
terest exception in an effort to reduce the carnage that domestic vio-
lence produces.201  Thus, the Lautenberg Amendment seeks to provide
commerce, and lower courts have upheld the statute as a valid exercise of Con-
gress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.”); see, e.g., Gillespie v. City of Indi-
anapolis, 13 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“In light of the overwhelming
weight of precedent, we find that § 922(g)(9) is a proper exercise of Congress’
power under the Commerce Clause.”); Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emp., Inc. v. Barrett,
968 F. Supp. 1564, 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998)
(stating that § 922(g)(9) contains a jurisdictional element that provides the requi-
site nexus between interstate commerce and federal regulation).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012); see Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1572 (identifying the
Lautenberg Amendment’s nexus with interstate commerce).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 as an impermissible use of Congress’ Commerce Clause
power); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding that the civil rem-
edy afforded in the Violence Against Women Act exceeded the bounds of congres-
sional authority).  Polly Pruneda even argues that Congress included the
statutory jurisdictional element in a purposeful attempt to evade any Commerce
Clause problems.  Pruneda, supra note 22, at 841; see also Coppolecchia et al.,
supra note 194, at 1507 (explaining that the judicial holding of United States v.
Morrison “likely prevented Congress from legislating in the area of domestic vio-
lence without some direct connection to interstate commerce”).
197. Nelson, supra note 177, at 366–67.
198. See id. at 366–67, 370; Ashley G. Pressler, Guns and Intimate Violence: A Consti-
tutional Analysis of the Lautenberg Amendment, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COM-
MENT. 705, 710 (1999).
199. Nelson, supra note 177, at 370–71.
200. Id.
201. Jessica A. Golden, Examining the Lautenberg Amendment in the Civilian and
Military Contexts: Congressional Overreaching, Statutory Vagueness, Ex Post
Facto Violations, and Implementational Flaws, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427,
429–40 (2001).
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a proactive solution to domestic violence homicide in which no individ-
ual is above the law.
IV. ONE HIT LEADS TO ANOTHER: INTERPRETING THE
LAUTENBURG AMENDMENT’S “PHYSICAL FORCE”
REQUIREMENT
While controversy over passage of the Lautenberg Amendment
still exists, the most recent attacks have focused on the legislation’s
textual vagueness, particularly with regard to the “physical force” re-
quirement.  Although § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) requires that a predicate of-
fense have “as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force,
or the threatened use of a deadly weapon,” the term “physical force” is
never defined.202  Courts have thus been tasked with determining the
degree of force necessary for a misdemeanor to qualify as a predicate
crime of domestic violence.  Such responsibility resulted in a circuit
split, which required Supreme Court resolution in early 2014.
A. Love Is a Battlefield: The Circuit Split
Among the courts that have interpreted the physical force require-
ment, the First, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have es-
poused conflicting interpretations.  In particular, the First, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits (collectively, the “Expansive Courts”) held that
simple assault and battery convictions suffice as predicate offenses
under the Lautenberg Amendment.203  In contrast, the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits (collectively, the “Restrictive Courts”) concluded that a
generic assault and battery statute criminalizing unlawful touching
did not require physical force for completion, and thus, did not fall
within the scope of the Lautenberg Amendment.  This section briefly
details the relevant appellate cases and sets the stage for the Supreme
Court’s necessary intervention.
As early as 1999, the Eighth Circuit espoused one of the first ap-
pellate interpretations of the term “physical force” in the context of
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s domestic violence requirement.  William Maurice
Smith (Smith) pleaded guilty to simple misdemeanor assault under
Section 708.1(1) of the Iowa Code, which criminalizes “[a]ny act which
is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in
physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another.”204
Following a subsequent firearms violation, the government charged
Smith with illegal possession of a gun as a domestic violence convict
202. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2012).
203. See United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Smith,
171 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir.
2006).
204. Smith, 171 F.3d at 619–20; IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.1(1) (West 2003).
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pursuant to § 922(g)(9).205  In concluding that Smith’s assaultive con-
duct qualified as a predicate misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,
the Eighth Circuit found the plain text of Section 708.1(1) of the Iowa
Code to have, as an element, the use or attempted use of force, and did
not condition this decision on the degree of force employed.206
Expanding on this analysis three years later, the First Circuit in-
terpreted Maine’s general-purpose assault statute to determine
whether the “offensive physical contact” prong involved the use or at-
tempted use of physical force.207  Authorities in Maine filed a criminal
complaint against Robert Nason (Nason) for intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact to his
wife in contravention of Title 17-A, Section 20 of the Maine Revised
Statutes.208  Less than two years later, Nason pawned a rifle and then
redeemed it, violating § 922(g)(9).209  Looking first at the standard
definitions of “physical force,” the First Circuit defined the concept as
“elementary” and “readily understood.”210  Reasoning that a straight-
forward application of the term precluded ambiguity, the court in-
ferred that Congress did not intend to engraft a bodily injury
requirement into § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).211
The First Circuit further bolstered its reasoning by examining 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which immediately precedes § 922(g)(9).  Section
922(g)(8)(C)(ii) includes a qualifying clause that limits its reach specif-
ically to crimes involving “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force . . . that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily
injury.”212  Unable to dismiss this limiting clause as mere surplusage,
the court interpreted the lack of a “bodily injury” requirement in
§ 922(g)(9) as purposeful.213  This language differential, according to
the court, “means that we must read the unqualified use of the term
‘physical force’ in section 922(g)(9) as a clear signal of Congress’s in-
tent that section 922(g)(9) encompass misdemeanor crimes involving
all types of physical force, regardless of whether they could reasonably
be expected to cause bodily injury.”214  This interpretation comports
with Senator Lautenberg’s intention to broaden the spectrum of predi-
cate offenses covered by § 922(g)(9).215  Thus, the court found Nason’s
205. Smith, 171 F.3d at 619.
206. Id. at 620–21.
207. Nason, 269 F.3d at 11.
208. Id. at 12; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207 (2001) (“A person is guilty
of assault if . . . [t]he person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury or offensive physical contact to another person.”).
209. Nason, 269 F.3d at 12.
210. Id. at 16.
211. Id.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) (2012) (emphasis added).
213. Nason, 269 F.3d at 16–17.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 17.
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conviction under Maine’s general assault statute to qualify as a predi-
cate offense despite the lack of violence or bodily injury.
Most recently, the Eleventh Circuit supplemented this reasoning
in 2006, when it used the dictionary definition of “physical force” to
analyze Georgia’s criminal battery statute.  Jerry Griffith (Griffith)
pleaded guilty to two counts of simple battery in August 2000, after he
beat his wife and dragged her across the floor in violation of Section
16-5-23(a) of the Georgia Code.216  Pursuant to Section 16-5-23(a), “[a]
person commits the offense of simple battery when he or she either: (1)
Intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking na-
ture with the person of another; or (2) Intentionally causes physical
harm to another.”217  Following this incident, authorities found Grif-
fith illegally in possession of a firearm, and charged him under
§ 922(g)(9).218
Employing the same categorical approach as the First and Eighth
Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the raw text of Section 16-5-
23(a) to determine whether “physical contact of an insulting or pro-
voking nature” necessarily involved the requisite physical force to
serve as a predicate offense under § 922(g)(9).219  Looking first at dic-
tionary definitions, the Eleventh Circuit defined physical force as
“[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed against a person consisting in
a physical act.”220  Under this definition, a person would be unable to
make physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature without ex-
erting some minimal level of force.221
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit examined the significance of the
limiting language in § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii), and concluded that Congress
intentionally omitted “bodily injury” from § 922(g)(9).  According to
the court, “[i]f Congress had wanted to limit the physical force require-
ment in § 922(g)(9), it could have done so, as it did in the last clause of
the preceding paragraph of the same subsection. . . . That it did not
speaks loudly and clearly.”222  Imposing a level of force requirement
(i.e., “violent”) on § 922(g)(9) would run afoul of common sense and
constitute impermissible statutory remodeling.223  Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit found the Georgia statute sufficient to serve as a predicate of-
fense under § 922(g)(9).
In direct contrast to the Expansive Courts’ decisions, the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits held that the physical force to which § 922(g)(9)
216. United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339, 1340 (11th Cir. 2006).
217. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-23(a) (2005).
218. Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1340.
219. Id. at 1341.
220. Id. at 1342 (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 1343–45.
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and § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) refer is not de minimis.224  In United States v.
Belless, authorities charged Robert Belless (Belless) with violating
Wyoming’s general assault and battery statute, Section 6-2-501(b) of
the Wyoming Statutes, after he grabbed his wife by the chest and neck
and pushed her angrily against a car.225  This statute makes it unlaw-
ful for any individual to unlawfully touch another in a rude, insolent,
or angry manner, or  “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause
bodily injury to another person by use of physical force.”226  Six years
later, Belless was indicted for felony possession of a firearm under
§ 922(g)(9).227
Interpreting this Wyoming statute, the Ninth Circuit found that
the statutory language encompasses conduct that does not necessarily
involve the use or attempted use of physical force.  According to the
court, “[a]ny touching constitutes ‘physical force’ in the sense of
Newtonian mechanics,” but the federal statute commands more than
technical force.228  The associated phrase in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) is
“threatened use of a deadly weapon,” which imposes a heightened
danger requirement.229  As such, the physical force at issue in the fed-
eral definition is violent force against the body of another individual,
not merely any force.230  The Wyoming statute, however, criminalizes
behavior that is minimally forcible and ungentlemanly, and embraces
conduct outside the scope of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).231  Thus, the Wyoming
statute cannot serve as the necessary predicate offense for § 922(g)(9).
Analyzing the same Wyoming statute five years later, the Tenth
Circuit echoed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and held that Wyoming’s
battery statute did not categorically satisfy the definition of a “misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence.”232  Defining “physical force” as
“[f]orce consisting in a physical act, esp. a violent act directed against
a robbery victim,” the Tenth Circuit articulated that some degree of
power or violence must be present to constitute physical force.233  Any
number of “touchings” or indirect contact might be considered “rude”
or “insolent” under the Wyoming statute, but would not rise to the
necessary level of physical force under § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).234  While
the Expansive Courts may be scientifically correct in their definition
224. See, e.g., United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated by
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014); United States v. Hays, 526
F.3d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 2008).
225. Belless, 338 F.3d at 1065.
226. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-501(b) (2014); Belless, 338 F.3d at 1067.
227. Belless, 338 F.3d at 1065.
228. Id. at 1067.
229. Id. at 1068.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d 674, 679 (10th Cir. 2008).
233. Id. at 677 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (8th ed. 2004)).
234. Id. at 679.
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of “physical force,” they nonetheless collapse the distinction between
violent and non-violent offenses.235  This error could give federal stat-
utes similar to § 922(g)(9) an overly broad scope and impact.236
Moreover, the legislative history of § 922(g)(9) indicates a limited
application to episodes of violent physical force.  The Tenth Circuit
explained:
Indeed, during the debate of the bill that later became 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9),
one of the sponsoring senators referred repeatedly to “wife beaters” and “child
abusers,” and also to “people who engage in serious spousal or child abuse,”
“those who commit family violence,” and “people who show they cannot control
themselves and are prone to fits of violent rage,” suggesting that the concern
was with violent individuals rather than those who have merely touched their
spouse or child in a rude manner.237
Additional legislative comments make clear the statute’s purpose
was confined to domestic abusers who previously fell outside the
bounds of the federal firearm ban because they were convicted of
lesser offenses due to plea bargains or outdated thinking.238  This leg-
islative intent did not extend to de minimis physical contact, but
rather only encompassed violent episodes of rage and anger.  Thus,
the Tenth Circuit’s decision reinforced the Ninth Circuit’s holding and
heightened the judicial divide regarding the requisite level of force
necessary to constitute a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
Therefore, in an effort to resolve this judicial disagreement, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in the case of United States v. Castle-
man on October 1, 2013.
B. Stuck in the Middle with You: The Supreme Court’s
Unprecedented Ruling on Domestic Violence
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari and oral argument in Cas-
tleman occurred during a politicized period in which Congress sought
to expand the prohibition list of domestic violence offenses to include
temporary protective orders and stalking crimes.239  The Obama ad-
ministration added further fuel to the fire, claiming that affirming the
Restrictive Courts’ holding would render the Lautenberg Amendment
largely inoperative and nullify similar laws throughout the states.240
Media outlets professed that the wrong decision “could leave abused
235. Id. at 681.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 679–80 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S8831–06 (1996)).
238. Id. at 680.
239. US Supreme Court to Review Existing Gun Ban for Domestic Abusers, RT (Oct. 2,
2013), http://rt.com/usa/scotus-gun-ban-domestic-abusers-656/, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/38WZ-EU7X.
240. Id.; see High Court Bolsters Domestic Violence Gun Ban Law, YAHOO NEWS (Mar.
26, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/high-court-bolsters-domestic-violence-gun-ban-
law-153041067—politics.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/PA95-Q5PU.
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women and children vulnerable to gun violence and impose serious
costs on communities across the country.”241  With the stakes “ex-
traordinarily high,”242 the Supreme Court issued one of its most ac-
tivist decisions to date on the topic of domestic violence.
1. I Knew You Were Trouble: Background and Procedural
Posture of United States v. Castleman
James Castleman (Castleman) pleaded guilty to misdemeanor as-
sault in violation of Tennessee Code Section 39-13-111(b) on July 16,
2001.243  This Tennessee statute imposes criminal liability on any de-
fendant who intentionally or knowingly causes bodily harm to a do-
mestic abuse victim.244  Castleman’s indictment acknowledged the
satisfaction of these statutory elements, and disclosed that Castleman
physically injured the mother of his child.245  Pursuant to the
Lautenberg Amendment, this conviction permanently barred Castle-
man from purchasing or selling firearms.
Approximately seven years later, however, federal authorities dis-
covered Castleman dealing firearms on the black market.  Castle-
man’s wife purchased the firearms under her name and turned the
weapons over to her husband for sale.246  Given Castleman’s prohibi-
tion from purchasing or possessing firearms, the prosecutor indicted
Castleman on two counts of illegal firearm possession pursuant to
§ 922(g)(9).  The district court dismissed these claims on April 30,
2010, finding that Castleman’s misdemeanor domestic assault convic-
tion did not qualify as a predicate offense because it did not require
the “use or attempted use of force” as defined in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).247
In so holding, the district court “rejected the construction adopted by
other circuits . . . under which a domestic assault conviction resulting
from ‘subtle and indirect uses of physical force’ would permit liability
under § 922(g)(9).”248  Rather, the district court reasoned that Tennes-
see Code Section 39-13-111(b)(1) permitted a conviction for non-physi-
cal assaultive conduct, which fell outside the bounds of § 922(g)(9).249
Following this ruling, the government moved for reconsideration and
timely appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
241. McFadyen-Ketchum, supra note 18; see Burroughs, supra note 26 (“If the Su-
preme Court upholds the lower courts’ interpretation of the gun ban, it will im-
mensely cripple the law and the protection it affords.”).
242. McFadyen-Ketchum, supra note 18.
243. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014); United States v. Cas-
tleman, 695 F.3d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 2012).
244. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111(b) (2014); see id. § 39-13-101.
245. Castleman, 695 F.3d at 584.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 584–85.
249. Id. at 585.
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A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding by different reasoning.  Using principles of statutory interpre-
tation, “[t]he majority held that the degree of physical force required
by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) is the same as required by § 924(e)(2)(B)(i),
which defines violent felony.”250  Specifically, the Sixth Circuit noted:
Section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) defines a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”
as a crime that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical
force,” against a victim with whom the defendant shares a domestic relation-
ship.  Like § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), §§ 16(a) and 924(e)(2)(B)(i) use the phrase
“physical force to define “crime of violence” and “violent felony,” respectively.
Section 16(a) defines a “crime of violence” in part as “an offense that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person or property of another.”  For its part, § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) defines a “vi-
olent felony” in part as a crime “that has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force.”  By defining a “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” to require “the use or attempted use of physical force,”
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) drops the reference to “threatened use” from §§ 16(a) and
924(e)(2)(B)(i) but otherwise tracks the language of §§ 16(a) and
924(e)(2)(B)(i).  The provisions’ similarity supports the inference that Con-
gress intended them to capture offenses criminalizing identical degrees of
force.251
Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that violent force was necessary
to sustain a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
pursuant to § 922(g)(9).
Employing this strategic framework, the Sixth Circuit next ad-
dressed whether Castleman’s particular crime under Tennessee Code
Section 39-13-111(b) qualified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic vi-
olence.  Relying on precedent from United States v. McMurray,252
which held that a Tennessee aggravated assault conviction was not a
predicate offense under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), the majority answered in the
negative.  In particular, the majority explained that § 39-13-111(b)
only criminalizes the infliction of bodily injury, which can be achieved
without the use of violent force.253  “Therefore, a defendant could vio-
late Tennessee Code Section 39-13-111(b) both in a manner that con-
stitutes a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ and in a manner
that does not.”254  Because Castleman’s indictment did not provide a
basis from which to identify the degree of force used, the Sixth Circuit
refused to categorize his assault as involving the use of violent force.
This ruling deepened the preexisting circuit split, and the United
States timely appealed.
250. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014).
251. Castleman, 695 F.3d at 586.
252. 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2011).
253. Castleman, 695 F.3d at 590.
254. Id.
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2. You Give Love a Bad Name: The Supreme Court Reverses
On March 26, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued a
seemingly huge victory for domestic violence victims.  Authored by
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the 9–0 decision represented a triumph for
gun control groups and victim assistance advocates.255  Although per-
ceived by some as a “distinctly feminist decision on domestic violence
law,” media outlets praised the opinion for forcing individuals to rec-
ognize the unique manner in which power and position can transform
a single act of violence over time.256  By categorizing routine battery
convictions as sufficient to trigger the federal gun ban, the Court
crafted an expansive definition of domestic violence to address the real
harms committed within homes and relationships.
The Court began its analysis with an interpretation of the term
“force,” as used in § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).  Resorting to the term’s widely
accepted common law definition, the Court quickly held that “force”
encompassed all offensive touchings against another individual.257
Specifically, the Court distinguished precedent from Johnson v.
United States, in which the Justices defined the term “violent felony”
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).258  Comparable to a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, a violent felony has, as an
element, the use of physical force.259  The Court, however, declined to
read the common law definition of “force” into the ACCA’s definition of
“violent felony” because it was a “comical misfit with the defined
term.”260  Rather, to comport with the statute’s plain text, a violent
felony necessarily requires violent physical force.261  But, in the case
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic abuse, the term “violent” is con-
spicuously absent.  Thus, the common law meaning of “force” as even
the slightest offensive touching fits perfectly with the statute’s plain
language.262
255. See Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Upholds Gun Ban for Domestic Violence, USA
TODAY (Mar. 26, 2014, 4:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/20
14/03/26/supreme-court-guns-domestic-violence/6918457/, archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/S6TP-J4PE; see also David G. Savage, Supreme Court Keeps Guns
Away from Those Guilty of Domestic Violence, LA TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014, 7:27 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-court-guns-20140327-story.html, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/6RT7-5HNH (reporting on the Supreme Court disposition
in U.S. v. Castleman).
256. Alexandra Brodsky, SCOTUS Recognizes Expansive Definition of Domestic Vio-
lence, FEMINISTING (Mar. 28, 2014), http://feministing.com/2014/03/28/scotus-rec
ognizes-expansive-definition-of-domestic-violence/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/Y4ML-EQ3T.
257. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1410 (2014).
258. Id.; Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010).
259. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2014).
260. Johnson, 559 U.S. at 145.
261. Id. at 140.
262. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410.
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Furthermore, the Court found compelling public policy and legisla-
tive rationales for applying the broad definition of force to misde-
meanor crimes of domestic violence.263  First, the Court analyzed the
typical prosecution cycle of domestic violence offenses.  Because perpe-
trators of domestic abuse are routinely charged and prosecuted under
general state assault and battery laws, the level of force used to sup-
port a common-law battery conviction should logically apply to a mis-
demeanor crime of domestic violence.264
Second, the Court outlined the inherent differences between do-
mestic violence and other forms of non-partner abuse.  Explaining
that domestic assault is simply a “type of violence,” the Court recog-
nized that domestic abuse may occur in a non-violent context.265  Such
non-violent physical force may include hitting, slapping, shoving, bit-
ing, and hair pulling.  Instead of focusing on the amount of violence
used against the victim, the Court identified that domestic violence is
an accumulation of hurtful acts over time that subject a victim to an
abuser’s cycle of power and control.266  Thus, prosecution for a seem-
ingly minor act in the context of an intimate partner relationship does
not offend the common sense definition of misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence.
Third, the Court found “no anomaly in grouping domestic abusers
convicted of generic assault or battery offenses together with others
whom § 922(g) disqualifies from gun ownership.”267  Unlike the
ACCA, which classifies a defendant convicted of a violent felony as an
armed career criminal, a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
charge does not warrant such designation.268  Domestic abusers
would therefore suffer no further repercussions from their classifica-
tion under the statute.
Finally, the Court noted that any alternative interpretation of the
term “force” under § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) would have rendered § 922(g)(9)
inoperative in numerous States at the time of its enactment.269  Spe-
cifically, most local assault and battery statutes prohibit either (1)
both offensive touching and acts that cause bodily injury, or (2) solely
acts that result in bodily harm.  Thus, statutes that criminalize mere
offensive touching would fall outside the scope of § 922(g)(9), render-
ing § 922(g)(9) ineffective in at least ten states (constituting nearly
263. Id. (“The very reasons we gave for rejecting that meaning [of force] in defining a
‘violent felony’ are reasons to embrace it in defining a ‘misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence.’”).
264. Id. at 1411.
265. Id. at 1412.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1413.
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thirty percent of the nation’s population).270  For these combined rea-
sons, the Court held that the common law definition of “force” must be
applied to misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.
Applying this definition of “force” to the Tennessee statute, the
Court determined that Castleman was convicted of a crime that had,
as an element, the use or attempted use of force.  Adopting a modified
categorical approach, the Court consulted Castleman’s indictment to
determine under which provision of Section 39-13-111(b) of the Ten-
nessee Code he pled guilty.271  According to the Court, Castleman
pleaded guilty to having “intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily
injury,” and this intentional causation of harm necessarily involves
the use of physical force.272  In particular, the term “bodily injury”
under Tennessee law is broad, encompassing cuts, abrasions, bruises,
burns, physical pain, temporary illnesses, and disfigurements.273
These forms of injury all entail the use of physical force, bringing
them within the ambit of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).  It is impossible to cause
any form of bodily injury without applying or exerting force in the
common law sense.274
Having concluded its plain language interpretation of
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and § 922(g)(9), the Court next dismissed Castle-
man’s non-textual arguments.  Castleman relied heavily on the legis-
lative history of § 922(g)(9), arguing that the primary purpose of the
statute was to address serious spousal abuse by violent individuals.
In support of this argument, Castleman quoted Senators Lautenberg,
Hutchison, Wellstone, and Feinstein, who referred to “serious spousal
or child abuse,” “violent individuals,” “people who batter their wives,”
people who “brutalize” their significant others, and “severe and recur-
ring domestic violence” during the passage of § 922(g)(9).275  The
Court, however, focused extensively on § 922(g)(9)’s overarching pur-
pose, which was to keep guns out of the hands of domestic abusers.
Thus, “nothing about these Senators’ isolated references to severe do-
mestic violence suggests that they would not have wanted § 922(g)(9)
to apply to a misdemeanor assault conviction like Castleman’s.”276
The Court was similarly unmoved by Castleman’s constitutional
rights argument and invocation of the rule of lenity.  In a single para-
graph, Castleman argued that § 922(g)(9) mandates a narrow con-
struction because of its Second Amendment implications.  However,
because Castleman did not articulate a facial or as-applied challenge
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1414.
272. Id.
273. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(2) (1997); see Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414.
274. Id. at 1414–15.
275. Id. at 1415; see 142 CONG. REC. 22985–22986, 22988 (1996).
276. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1415.
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to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9), the Court sidestepped the is-
sue.277  Finally, the Court summarily dismissed Castleman’s rule of
lenity argument by identifying its inapplicability to § 922(g)(9).  Par-
ticularly, the rule of lenity only applies if there is grievous statutory
ambiguity or uncertainty such that the Court must guess at Con-
gress’s intent.278  This was not the case under § 922(g)(9)’s current
statutory scheme.
3. Can’t Fight This Feeling Anymore: The Two Concurring
Opinions
Although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Castleman was unani-
mous, three Justices disagreed with the majority’s rationale and
penned two concurring opinions on separate grounds.  Justice Antonin
Scalia “managed to fit in some of his classic conservative hysteria,”
and used narrower grounds to reach the same conclusion as the major-
ity.279  Beginning his response with an analysis of Johnson, Justice
Scalia advocated giving “physical force” the same definition as under
the ACCA in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).280  Both the ACCA and § 922(g)(9) are
designed to enhance public safety by prohibiting specific classes of
criminals from possessing firearms.281  The physical force clauses in
both statutes are nearly identical, and the presumption of common
usage suggests that a term generally possesses the same meaning
each time it is used.282  Thus, “[i]t would be surpassing strange” to
give two similar statutes different and contradictory meanings.283
The expansive definition of domestic violence used by the majority,
however, ignores this precedent and statutory text.  The Supreme
Court has twice addressed the meaning of physical force in the context
of violent crimes, and both times concluded that it applies solely to
violent force.284  The majority’s position that any common-law offen-
sive touching constitutes physical force is therefore in direct opposi-
tion to judicial precedent and common sense.285
277. Id. at 1416; see Adam Liptak, Sweeping Ruling on Domestic Violence, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/us/justices-view-gun-curbs-
broadly-in-domestic-violence-cases.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
Y84Z-YYRN.
278. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1416.
279. Brodksy, supra note 256; see Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1417–22 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment).
280. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1417 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.; see Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010); Leocal v. Ashcroft,
543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
285. See Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1417–18.
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Furthermore, applying the consistent and precedential definition
of physical force used in the ACCA would not have rendered
§ 922(g)(9) inoperative or a practical nullity, as argued by the major-
ity.  Excluding non-violent offensive touchings, § 922(g)(9) would have
been applicable in at least four-fifths of the States.286  Thirty-eight of
the forty-eight states that had misdemeanor assault or battery stat-
utes included the use of violent force within their scope.287  Approxi-
mately nineteen of the statutes covered infliction of bodily injury, not
offensive touching, and the remaining nineteen statutes prohibited
both offensive touching and bodily injury.288  These latter nineteen
statutes, however, encompassed both forms of harm in a divisible
manner, such that a court could identify the basis for a conviction by
inspecting the charging documents.289  Thus, only ten states would
have been excluded from the scope of § 922(g)(9).
Moreover, Justice Scalia examined the definitions of domestic vio-
lence in effect at the time the statute was enacted.  These dictionaries
and authorities defined domestic violence as possessing the same
meaning as ordinary violence, but occurring within a domestic set-
ting.290  Indeed, Congress even defined the term “crime of domestic
violence” as a “crime of violence” in a separate provision of the same
bill that enacted § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).291  The majority, however, ignored
these authorities and relied on various definitions of domestic abuse
submitted in an amicus brief filed by the National Network to End
Domestic Violence, and two publications produced by the Department
of Justice’s Office on Violence Against Women.292  These sources are
problematic, given that the organizations can define domestic violence
in any manner they wish.293  By relying on improper definitions of
domestic abuse, the majority distorted the law and impoverished the
statute’s plain language.  Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, the
level of force required to constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence must be force capable of causing physical pain or bodily in-
jury.294  Yet, despite this fundamental dispute with the majority, Jus-
tice Scalia nonetheless found that Castleman’s conviction invoked the
requisite amount of physical force to constitute a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence, and concurred in the judgment.
Similarly, Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Clarence Thomas con-
curred solely with the majority’s judgment.  Disagreeing that a misde-
286. Id. at 1418.
287. Id. at 1419.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1420.
291. Id. at 1419–20.
292. Id. at 1420–21.
293. Id. at 1421.
294. Id. at 1422.
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meanor crime of domestic violence incorporates the well-established
common law meaning of “force,” Justices Alito and Thomas declined to
extend the reasoning of Johnson to the issues in Castleman.295  Spe-
cifically, the two Justices noted that the Johnson Court intentionally
reserved judgment on a similar question presented, and, therefore, its
analysis should have been deemed inapplicable in the case at bar.296
V. CAN’T BUY ME LOVE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASTLEMAN AND
SUGGESTED STRATEGIES FOR PROSECUTORS AND
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
The tone of the Court’s opening paragraph left no doubt as to the
remainder of its ruling.  Resorting to statistics and persuasive rheto-
ric, Justice Sotomayor boldly introduced her audience to the perils of
domestic violence.  By immediately tugging on the public’s sympa-
thies, the Court diverted speculation away from the merits of its argu-
ment and gained justification through emotions and empathy.  This
introductory analysis of domestic violence—although tangentially re-
lated to the Court’s argument—served primarily as a form of sly ma-
nipulation designed to predispose citizens to accept its holding.  The
majority’s reasoning, however, is fundamentally flawed, and this sec-
tion begins by unveiling the blatant activism present in the majority’s
opinion.  This section then tackles the pressing question of whether
Castleman and pending legislative efforts can successfully wage war
against domestic violence.  Answering this question in the negative,
the Article advocates for non-legal intervention and progressive edu-
cational programs to target potential domestic violence abusers in
their formative years.  Finally, this section offers strategic advice for
both prosecutors and defense attorneys in light of Castleman.
A. ‘Cause I Like It That Way: Using Judicial Activism to
Protest Domestic Violence
The Supreme Court’s decision in Castleman, while perceived as a
glowing victory for the Obama administration and domestic rights ad-
vocates, is unfortunately misguided and incorrect.  Ignoring potent
precedent regarding the definition of physical force, Justice Sotomayor
molded the law into an activist weapon to use in the fight against do-
mestic violence.  The majority’s opinion in Castleman, no matter how
well-intentioned, serves as yet another example of the Court bending
the law to its will.  By adopting a broad interpretation of physical
force, the Court violated legal precedent and defined the same term
differently in similarly worded statutes.
295. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
296. Id.
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As Justice Scalia aptly observed, the Court has twice fashioned a
definition for “physical force”—once in Johnson v. United States and
again in Leocal v. Ashcroft.  In Johnson, the Court was tasked with
determining whether the Florida offense of battery had, as an ele-
ment, the use of physical force sufficient to constitute a violent felony
under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) of the ACCA.297  Similar to § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii),
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) does not define the phrase “physical force.”  Thus, the
Court applied the term’s ordinary meaning.298  The adjective “physi-
cal,” while clear in meaning, was unhelpful in determining the level of
force required to constitute a violent felony.  Rather, the Court focused
extensively on the noun “force,” which has a number of specialized def-
initions.  According to the Court, “force” means:
“[S]trength or energy; active power, vigor; often an unusual degree of strength
or energy” . . . “[p]ower, violence, compulsion, or constraint exerted upon a
person.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 717 (9th ed. 2009) (hereinafter Black’s) de-
fines “force” as “[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed against a person or
thing.”  And it defines “physical force” as “[f]orce consisting in a physical act,
esp. a violent act directed against a robbery victim.”299
All of these definitions “suggest a degree of power that would not
be satisfied by the merest touching.”300
However, the Court noted that a specialized legal definition of the
word “force” exists, casting doubt on these dictionary interpretations.
Referring to the common law meaning of “force,” which encompasses
even the slightest offensive touching, the Court explicitly confronted
the issue of whether this common law definition superseded the dic-
tionary analysis.  In ruling against the common law interpretation,
the Court explained that context determines meaning, and common
law definitions should not be implanted where they plainly do not
make sense.301  Here, the Court was interpreting the phrase “violent
felonies,” and concluded that the slightest offensive touching would be
contradictory to the term’s plain language.302  Thus, the Court re-
quired the use of violent physical force to satisfy § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).303
Similarly, in Leocal, the Court examined the term “crime of vio-
lence” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 16.304  Section 16(a) defines a crime of
violence as an offense having as an element the use of physical force
against the person or property of another.305  Honing in on the context
of the statute, the Court found it critical that the phrase “use of force”
297. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 135 (2010).
298. Id. at 138.
299. Id. at 139 (citation omitted).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 139–40.
302. Id. at 140.
303. Id.
304. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
305. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2014).
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implies active employment.306  This holding removed all reckless and
negligent conduct from the ambit of § 16.  Furthermore, the Court de-
termined that an ordinary meaning of the phrase “crime of violence”
“suggests a category of violent, active crimes.”307  Therefore, the Court
imposed heightened mens rea and force requirements to ensure the
statutory purpose of § 16 was satisfied.
In the domestic violence context, no rationale exists for departing
from this well-established Supreme Court precedent.  First, the Court
has addressed almost identical statutory language twice, and held
that the common law definition of force was insufficient both times.
Second, although the Court never previously analyzed the use of phys-
ical force in the context of a misdemeanor, the circumstances sur-
rounding the enactment of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) and § 922(g)(9) suggest
that a heightened level of force is required.  The Lautenberg Amend-
ment was originally enacted to close the dangerous loophole of felony
domestic violence abusers plea bargaining to misdemeanor of-
fenses.308  The law was never intended to target minimal abuse insuf-
ficient to trigger a felony statute at the outset.  The majority opinion
misinterprets this legislative intent underlying the Lautenberg
Amendment, and incorrectly applies the federal gun ban to all levels
of domestic abuse.
In light of Supreme Court precedent and the fundamental purpose
of the Lautenberg Amendment, the Court should have held that do-
mestic violence crimes sufficient to trigger the federal gun ban require
violent physical force, not mere offensive touching.  Under this frame-
work, a domestic violence misdemeanant should only lose his firearm
rights if he employs force sufficient to trigger a felony domestic vio-
lence charge.  A domestic abuser whose actions solely amount to a
misdemeanor does not implicate the Lautenberg Amendment, as he is
not plea bargaining to escape the federal firearms ban.  There are few
material differences between being charged with one misdemeanor
and plea bargaining to a separate misdemeanor.
The Court’s decision, however, ignored the stated purpose of the
Lautenberg Amendment in favor of an activist approach against do-
mestic violence.  Viewing Castleman as the appropriate vehicle to
crack down on domestic abusers, the Court took advantage of an op-
portunity to protect domestic violence victims.  While such action is
commendable, manipulating the law in this manner exceeds the
bounds of Supreme Court review.  This explicit judicial activism repre-
sents “a grave threat to the rule of law because unaccountable federal
judges are usurping democracy, ignoring the Constitution and its sep-
aration of powers, and imposing their personal opinions upon the pub-
306. Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10–11.
307. Id. at 11.
308. Fredheim, supra note 178, at 501.
140 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:101
lic.”309  Such result-oriented decision-making “is truly unforgiveable,”
and the Constitution mandates that the legislature effectuate these
policy changes, not the courts.310 Castleman thus serves as a repre-
sentative case in which the Supreme Court’s heart overruled its head.
This disregard for precedent, however, earned the Supreme Court
favorable media coverage and many perceive this opinion as critical
for helping to permanently end abuse.
B. My Knight in Shining Armor Turned Out to Be a Loser in
Aluminum: Why Castleman and Pending Legislative
Initiatives Will Not Reduce Domestic Violence
and Why Education is Critical in the Fight
Against Domestic Abuse
Although the press widely praised Castleman as a landmark deci-
sion adopting a progressive stance against domestic violence, the un-
deniable reality remains that Castleman is simply a piece of paper.
The Court’s decision in Castleman, while symbolic of shifting attitudes
towards domestic abuse, merely establishes a heightened standard
under which domestic abusers may be prosecuted.  The opinion brings
additional domestic violence perpetrators within the scope of
§ 922(g)(9), but does little to actually address the underlying societal
patterns that create such abuse.  Rather, the Supreme Court has es-
poused a decision that relies heavily on law enforcement officers and
prosecutors to implement, without considering the unique burdens in-
creased domestic violence cases will place on already crowded court
dockets.  Furthermore, the opinion fails to evaluate the underlying ef-
ficiency and success of § 922(g)(9) as a realistic and workable remedy
for domestic violence victims.  This section explores why Castleman
will likely not have an appreciable impact on the lives of domestic vio-
lence victims, and evaluates the downfalls of pending legislative
initiatives.
Fundamentally, although § 922(g)(9) purports to save women’s
lives, prosecutions under the statute have been disappointingly low.
During its first year of enactment in 1996, only one prosecution oc-
curred under § 922(g)(9), and there were only ten prosecutions in
1997.311  While these numbers steadily increased over subsequent
years, eventually reaching 159 prosecutions in 2000, the total number
of § 922(g)(9) prosecutions total only two to three percent of all prose-
cutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for illegal possession of firearms.312
309. Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555,
555 (2010).
310. Barrera v. State, 982 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (Baird, J.,
dissenting); see Siegel, supra note 309, at 563.
311. Lininger, supra note 145, at 532.
312. Id.
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“The low rate of prosecution under section 922(g)(9) is alarming given
early predictions that one million potential defendants would meet the
requirements for prosecution under this statute.”313
In addition to the statute’s low prosecution statistics, the referral
rate for domestic violence misdemeanants who are found in possession
of firearms is abysmal.  Between 2000 and 2002, for example, the total
number of suspected domestic violence offenders in possession of fire-
arms totaled 18,653.314  Of these misdemeanants, only 630 were re-
ferred to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution—a mere 3.4 percent.315  This
embarrassing referral rate is further downgraded and compounded by
the serious enforcement problems that persist under § 922(g)(9).  Ac-
cording to the General Accounting Office, between 1998 and 2001, at
least 3,000 domestic violence misdemeanants subject to the federal
gun ban were able to acquire new guns from federally licensed deal-
ers.316  “Thus, for every one person prosecuted under section 922(g)(9),
ten more bought new guns in so conspicuous a manner that their
purchases could be documented by federal investigators.”317  These
statistics greatly call into question the effectiveness of § 922(g)(9), and
highlight its blatant inefficiencies in protecting domestic violence
victims.
Yet, despite § 922(g)(9)’s troubled and limited enforcement, recent
legislative efforts concentrate extensively on broadening the scope of
abusers who are subject to the firearms ban in § 922(g)(9).318  These
congressional initiatives seek to include stalkers and abusive dating
partners within the category of perpetrators for whom the federal gun
ban applies.319  Specifically, Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) pro-
posed legislation that attempts to subject a new category called “non-
intimate dating partners” to the federal gun ban.320  Serving as an
amendment to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, the
Klobuchar Bill (titled Protecting Domestic Violence and Stalking Vic-
tims Act of 2013) intends to revise the definition of an “intimate part-
ner” to include dating partners, and seeks to criminalize the use or
313. Id.; see Kersey, supra note 67, at 1920 (“Considering that 11 percent of all re-
ported and unreported violence results from family violence, intuition suggests
that the number of convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) would be
substantial.”).
314. Kersey, supra note 67, at 1920.
315. Id.
316. Lininger, supra note 145, at 532.
317. Id.
318. See Richinick, supra note 133.
319. See id.; see also Caldwell, supra note 133 (reporting on legislative efforts to ex-
pand gun restrictions for domestic abusers).
320. Dennis Santiago, Guns in America: What’s Up with Domestic Violence in the Sen-
ate?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2014, 1:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
dennis-santiago/guns-in-america-whats-up_b_5638545.html, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/9HHH-PPLS.
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attempted use of physical force by a dating partner.321  The bill fur-
ther prohibits the sale or disposition of a firearm to any person who
has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of stalking.322
The problem with this bill and similar initiatives, however, is that
§ 922(g)(9) has proven ineffective at appreciably reducing firearm
sales to current domestic violence perpetrators.  Broadening the scope
of an already flawed and unworkable statute will have no meaningful
effect on discouraging domestic violence crimes.  Additionally, due
process concerns are implicated because ex parte restraining orders
are routinely granted without a defendant’s presence.  While the de-
fendant may appear at a ten-day hearing and contest the restraining
order, the rules of evidence are frequently disregarded, and such civil
actions do not normally culminate in a trial.  Rather, a judge will
make a decision on the defendant’s right to possess a gun solely based
on one civil hearing that does not involve proof or evidence.  Whereas
an individual charged with a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
must be legally convicted before he loses his firearm rights, the
Klobuchar bill would permanently remove gun possession for individ-
uals who are subject to a civil restraining order that does not encom-
pass the evidentiary standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.  Surely,
the protections of the Second Amendment are not such that they can
be disposed of by a mere civil hearing.323
This recent legislative action, coupled with the enforcement limita-
tions of § 922(g)(9) begs the obvious question: How do we effectively
stop domestic violence?  While the law is a key element in advancing a
vision of ending violence against women, it cannot be the central fo-
cus.  Despite the enormous strides in gender equality over the de-
cades, the reality remains that women live in a patriarchal society.
Societal expectations demand that men exhibit strong, powerful, and
masculine qualities while women should be reserved, kind, and obedi-
ent.324  Powerful and independent women challenge this societal bal-
ance and trigger shame in men who appear weak in comparison.  The
humiliation and stigma that attach to men perceived as powerless and
fragile is an underlying trigger in the cycle of violence.  Yet, when
such pervasive emphasis is placed on individual offenders and victims,
321. Protecting Domestic Violence and Stalking Victims Act of 2013, S. 1290, 113th
Cong. (2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4HJZ-5WTF.
322. Id.
323. See Brief for Gun Owners Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent at 22, United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (No. 12-1371).
324. Lisa Firestone, Why Domestic Violence Occurs and How to Stop It, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 22, 2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisa-firestone/do
mestic-violence-awareness_b_2000652.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
UV7E-YSCT.
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“little attention has been paid to identifying and modifying the struc-
tural and cultural sources of abusive behavior.”325
With this gender imbalance ingrained in individuals throughout
their formative childhood years, it is unrealistic to expect abusers to
alter their behavior as a result of short domestic violence intervention
programs or imprisonment.  These legal remedies, aimed at halting
the immediate threat of violence against victims, do little for long-
term prevention of domestic abuse.326  Rates of domestic violence have
not dramatically declined since the inception of legal reforms in the
United States, but rather have kept pace with the overall declining
crime rate.327  The police and prosecution systems are disappointingly
incident-driven, and this nature is incompatible with the complexity of
abuse.328  By filtering the societal response to domestic violence
through the criminal justice system, the government effectively
equates intimate partner abuse with discrete assault, and encourages
police officers and prosecutors to measure the seriousness of the as-
sault by the level of injury inflicted.329  As previously noted, this ap-
proach ignores the repetitive and escalating cycle of harassment and
abuse that domestic violence victims endure.  Thus, the criminal jus-
tice system and corresponding legal structures are systematically bi-
ased to address only individual specific acts of abuse, not the
harrowing and ongoing violence that victims endure daily.330
Rather than rely on a largely reactive legal system to curb intimate
partner violence, society must address abuse in non-confrontational
and educational settings that begin in elementary school.331  Educa-
tional intervention is one of the only prevention programs that does
not rely exclusively on criminal punishment, and these educational in-
itiatives have been repeatedly urged by domestic violence task
forces.332  For example, positive results have been reported for Safe
Dates, a school and community initiative that includes a ten-session
325. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 2; see MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 4
(“Looking at the underlying context of the situation is often beyond the interest or
scope of an investigation by a criminal justice system that favors efficiency and
frowns on ambiguity.”); see also GOODMARK, supra note 68, at 157 (“Law does not
fundamentally alter the structural conditions that create the context for abuse.”).
326. See BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 8 (“Mounting evidence suggests that crimi-
nal justice intervention alone has a limited effect on the size and nature of the
domestic violence problem . . . .”).
327. GOODMARK, supra note 68, at 154–55.
328. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 44, 66.
329. BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 19, at 11.
330. See id. at 31.
331. See Rocky Robinson, Domestic Violence—We Must Continue to Educate, HOUS.
LAW., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 6, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/UGL6-VCWA.
332. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 169–70.
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educational curriculum, theater production, and poster contest.333
Eighth and ninth grade students participating in this program have
reported less physical dating violence and victimization in the imme-
diate four years following the program than a similarly situated con-
trol group.334  The underlying conceptual framework of this program
centers on decreasing gender stereotypes and challenging norms asso-
ciated with partner violence.335  Thus, Safe Dates highlights the re-
wards of early intervention and demonstrates that effective domestic
violence remedies must be based on undermining societal gender con-
structs that depict women as inferior and males as controlling, mascu-
line figures.
Additionally, targeting domestic violence during childhood devel-
opment is key given that a majority of women are victimized and
raped before the age of eighteen.336  By educating men and women
from a young age about the perils of domestic abuse, society can help
individuals create and recognize healthy relationships.  These educa-
tional initiatives may also serve as a catalyst for undermining the
prevalence of patriarchy in society.  Society must alter its baseline cul-
tural attitudes if it hopes to appreciably reduce and end domestic
violence.
C. The Heart of the Matter: Strategies for Prosecutors and
Defense Attorneys
Regardless of the overwhelming need for educational intervention
to tackle domestic abuse, the fact remains that domestic violence will
continue to be addressed at the legislative and legal levels for the fore-
seeable future.  Given this reality, it is important for prosecutors and
defense attorneys to understand their strategic positions in light of
Castleman and the evolving domestic violence framework.  Facially,
prosecutions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence appear
straightforward: combine one part general assault or battery with one
part domestic relationship, and a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence is born.  Despite its facial simplicity, however, strategic tactics
and maneuvers exist for prosecutors and defense attorneys to
strengthen their respective chances of conviction and acquittal.  This
333. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY TO PREVENT VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 5 (2009), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Y6TJ-J36Y; Linda
Chamberlain, A Prevention Primer for Domestic Violence: Terminology, Tools,
and the Public Health Approach, VAWNET, http://www.vawnet.org/applied-re
search-papers/print-document.php?doc_id=1313 (last accessed Nov. 22, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/28JL-3YJP.
334. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 333, at 5; Chamberlain, supra note 333.
335. Chamberlain, supra note 333; ANN ROSEWATER, PROMOTING PREVENTION, TARGET-
ING TEENS: AN EMERGING AGENDA TO REDUCE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 14 (2003),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/W33J-RPUH.
336. MELOY & MILLER, supra note 62, at 170.
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section offers guidance for criminal case development, and explores
potential techniques to enhance negotiation power at the plea bar-
gaining table.
1. You Don’t Mess Around with Jim: Prosecutorial Strategies
The prosecutorial response to Castleman should focus on maximiz-
ing the effectiveness of the federal firearms prohibition as a pertinent
tool to disarm domestic abusers.  To the extent possible, prosecutors
must ensure that batterers are charged with and convicted of offenses
that qualify as misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.  Achieving
this goal requires extensive attention to the compilation of criminal
complaints, indictments, and charging instruments.  Specifically,
prosecutors must ensure the charging documents specify the precise
act(s) a defendant is charged with committing, and include all statu-
tory elements in an unambiguous and clear manner.337  This atten-
tion to detail is particularly necessary when faced with a divisible
statute, i.e., a statute in which one offense qualifies as a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence but the remaining portion of the statute
does not.338  Generic allegations in a criminal complaint may preclude
a judge from determining under which statutory section the defendant
was charged, and prevent his conviction from serving as a predicate
offense under § 922(g)(9).
Additionally, prosecutors must ensure the charging documents al-
lege—and the evidence supports—a domestic relationship between
the defendant and the victim.339  Although a domestic relationship is
not a separate element of the predicate offense, the Supreme Court
nonetheless held that it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in
a § 922(g)(9) prosecution.340  Including a description of the domestic
relationship in the charging documents “will facilitate identification of
convictions that will trigger the prohibition against possession of fire-
arms.”341  This is particularly useful in jurisdictions whose definition
of “domestic violence” includes relationships that do not fall within the
scope of § 922(g)(9).342
Furthermore, it is critical that the criminal complaint allege pur-
poseful and intentional conduct.  The Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed the issue of whether reckless or negligent physical harm
qualifies as the “use of physical force.”  As discussed more fully in the
337. Teresa M. Garvey, Disarming the Batterer: United States v. Castleman, STRATE-
GIES IN BRIEF (AEQUITAS, D.C.) Sept. 2014 at 1, 3, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/LW8H-GMZP.
338. See id.
339. Id. at 4.
340. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 421 (2009).
341. Garvey, supra note 337, at 4.
342. Id.
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section on defensive tactics, it is unlikely that reckless conduct is suffi-
cient to support a common law battery conviction and serve as a predi-
cate offense.343  Prosecutors must therefore take care to include the
highest mens rea supported by the evidence.344  There should never be
ambiguity as to a defendant’s mental state when attempting to convict
under § 922(g)(9).  Thus, it is the prosecutor’s responsibility to col-
laboratively interact with the investigating police officers when pre-
paring the charging documents, and ensure that a mens rea of
purposeful or intentional conduct can be alleged and supported in
court.  The inability to prove intentional or purposeful conduct will
likely preclude charging a defendant as a domestic violence
misdemeanant.
Finally, when faced with plea bargain negotiations, prosecutors
should not permit domestic abusers to plead guilty to lesser included
offenses that do not qualify as misdemeanor crimes of domestic vio-
lence.345  Allowing plea bargains to include general assault and bat-
tery convictions that do not implicate the federal gun ban would
circumvent the purpose of the Lautenberg Amendment, which is to
close a dangerous loophole that allows domestic abusers to plead
guilty to misdemeanor charges instead of felonies.  Where a prosecu-
tor possesses sufficient evidence to support an assault or battery, a
domestic relationship, and intentional or purposeful conduct, it is irre-
sponsible to allow the defendant to plead guilty to any lesser crime
that does not include a firearms ban.  Despite their overwhelmingly
busy dockets, prosecutors must give priority to domestic violence cases
that implicate § 922(g)(9) in order to effectuate the purpose of the
Lautenberg Amendment and keep victims safe.  Plea bargains for do-
mestic abuse cases under § 922(g)(9) should be limited only to circum-
stances in which the defendant agrees to a firearms ban with the
lesser included offense.  The defendant’s refusal to acquiesce should
preclude further plea bargain negotiations.
2. Not Ready to Make Nice: Defensive Tactics
In contrast to the prosecution’s strategies, defense attorneys
should endeavor to undercut the prosecution’s evidence regarding
mens rea and the existence of a domestic relationship.  Because the
prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, de-
fense attorneys may simply expose holes in the prosecution’s argu-
ments and easily remove the case from § 922(g)(9)’s grasp.  The most
obvious argument for defense attorneys centers on divisible assault or
battery statutes and ambiguous charging documents.  If the charging
343. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
344. See Garvey, supra note 337, at 3–4.
345. See generally id. at 4.
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documents and criminal complaint do not explicitly set forth the statu-
tory provision under which the defendant is charged, a conviction may
not be sustained under § 922(g)(9) if the statute also encompasses con-
duct outside the scope of § 922(g)(9).  The lack of specificity in the
charging documents is a saving grace for defense attorneys, and pro-
vides significant negotiating power at the bargaining table.
Additionally, defense attorneys have a strong argument that Cas-
tleman does not encompass the reckless use of physical force.  The only
express requirements for a predicate offense under § 922(g)(9) are that
it: (1) was a misdemeanor; (2) had, as an element, the use or at-
tempted use of force; and (3) was committed against an intimate do-
mestic partner.346  These elements do not specify or imply a particular
mens rea.347  In the absence of an express mental state, courts must
give terms their ordinary and natural meaning.348  Although the First
Circuit in United States v. Booker and United States v. Armstrong held
that a common interpretation of the phrase “use of physical force” in-
cludes reckless and intentional conduct, the Supreme Court recently
cast considerable doubt on these holdings.349  In footnote 8 of Castle-
man, the Supreme Court noted that the “use” of force requires active
employment rather than negligent or reckless conduct.350  While the
Court did not directly address the issue of recklessness in Castleman,
it stated that Courts of Appeals decisions since Leocal have almost
uniformly held that recklessness is insufficient to constitute the “use”
of force.351  These Circuit Courts reason that because recklessness is
defined as the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk, it is more akin to negligence than the intentional use of force.352
Although Leocal addressed “use of physical force” in the context of 18
U.S.C. § 16, it is not a stretch for defense attorneys to analogize § 16
to § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), given their identical terminology.353
346. United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2011).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 18–21; United States v. Armstrong, 706 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2013), vacated,
134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414 n.8
(2014).
350. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414 n.8.
351. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1335–36 (11th Cir.
2010); Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 2008); United
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Cir. 2006); Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260, 263–65 (3d Cir. 2005); Jobson v.
Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367, 373 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243
F.3d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 2001).
352. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d at 1336.
353. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2014) (“[T]he term ‘crime of violence’ means . . . an
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi-
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Moreover, the Supreme Court in Castleman articulated that not
every assault under Tennessee Code Section 39-13-101 involves the
use or attempted use of physical force.  Specifically, the Court warned
that the reckless causation of bodily injury might not qualify as the
“use” of force.354  In light of this decision, the Court vacated the First
Circuit’s holding in Armstrong, and remanded the case for reconsider-
ation in light of Castleman.355  Subsequently, on April 30, 2014, the
First Circuit issued an opinion in the case of United States v. Carter,
where it acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decision “casts
doubt” on whether reckless conduct constitutes the use of physical
force.356  The First Circuit determined that the validity of a conviction
under Maine’s general-purpose assault statute likely depends on
which mens rea prong served as the basis for the guilty plea and con-
viction.357  While not expressly overruling its decisions in Booker and
Armstrong, the First Circuit nonetheless established a strong founda-
tion for their reversal.  When the District of Maine reconsidered
Carter upon remand, it held that the defendant potentially pleaded
guilty to an offense with a mens rea of recklessness, and that such an
offense could not serve as a predicate misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence under § 922(g)(9).358  Thus, defense attorneys possess contin-
uously evolving sources of precedent that undermine the application
of reckless conduct to misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.
Furthermore, defense attorneys may add creativity to this argu-
ment by using the direct language of Castleman.  Specifically, Castle-
man held that the requirement of “use of physical force” is satisfied by
the degree of force that supports a common law battery conviction.
The strategic and creative argument for defense attorneys thus comes
down to whether an individual may commit common law battery by
recklessly causing physical harm or contact.  Defense attorneys should
analyze the particular wording of the state statute under which the
defendant was charged, and may assert a compelling argument that
the battery statute does not criminalize reckless conduct.
Finally, defense attorneys should scrutinize the nature of the rela-
tionship between the defendant and victim to ensure it actually falls
within the scope of § 922(g)(9).  As alluded to in the previous section
on prosecution strategies, state domestic violence statutes may en-
cal force against the person or property of another. . . . ” (emphasis added)), with
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2014) (“[T]he term ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence’ means an offense that . . . has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon. . . .” (emphasis added)).
354. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414.
355. Armstrong v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014).
356. United States v. Carter, 752 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2014).
357. Id.
358. United States v. Carter, No. 2:10-cr-00155, 2014 WL 3345045, at *4 (D. Me. July
8, 2014).
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compass broader relationships than those qualifying under
§ 922(g)(9).  While not an explicit element of a § 922(g)(9) prosecution,
a domestic relationship is nonetheless a critical component of a predi-
cate offense.  By undermining the domestic relationship, defense at-
torneys remove the federal firearm ban from the equation, and possess
stronger negotiating power for a plea bargain encompassing a lesser
included offense.  Thus, a defense attorney should strategically focus
on undercutting the prosecution’s assertions of domestic relationship
and intentional or purposeful mens rea, and look for ambiguity in the
charging documents.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Castleman represents a bold
statement against domestic abuse.  In Castleman, the Court inter-
preted the phrase “use of physical force” in a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence as encompassing all offenses that involve even the
slightest offensive touching.  The adoption of this common law defini-
tion of “force” has resulted in the expansion of § 922(g)(9)’s applicabil-
ity, and all domestic abusers who employ force against their
significant others are potentially subject to the federal gun ban.  This
holding turned the spotlight on a previously private and silent affair,
and has helped identify domestic violence as a key societal problem
worthy of judicial intervention.  By broadcasting the realities of every-
day domestic abuse, the Court has significantly aided in bringing well-
deserved attention to a national epidemic that does not discriminate
on the basis of race, gender, religion, or economic status.
Despite its noble intentions, however, the Supreme Court’s analy-
sis in Castleman is legally unsound.  The majority opinion ignores es-
tablished precedent that interprets the identical phrase “use of
physical force” in two similarly worded statutory provisions.  In both
Johnson and Leocal, the Court previously held that the use of physical
force refers solely to violent force, not mere offensive touching.  Yet,
the Supreme Court disregarded these precedential opinions in favor of
a broader, more expansive definition of force that better captures the
horrific realities that domestic abuse victims face on a daily basis.
While the Supreme Court’s empathy is understandable, its ruling is
incomprehensible in light of prior decisions and the rationale behind
the Lautenberg Amendment.
Specifically, the Lautenberg Amendment sought to apply the fed-
eral gun ban to domestic violence misdemeanants who were originally
charged with a domestic violence felony but later plea bargained down
to a misdemeanor offense.  The Lautenberg Amendment was never in-
tended to encompass routine domestic violence crimes, but rather
solely focused on domestic abuse sufficient to constitute a felony.  The
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Supreme Court’s expansion of the Lautenberg Amendment exceeded
its congressionally intended scope.
Moreover, while the Court’s decision symbolically discourages do-
mestic abuse, the likely reality remains that the decision will not ap-
preciably impact the lives of domestic violence victims.  Prosecutions
under § 922(g)(9) have been disappointingly low since its enactment,
and domestic violence misdemeanants may use other means of secur-
ing firearms, such as purchasing weapons from friends, neighbors,
family members, or on the black market.  The government possesses
no comprehensive method of tracking gun purchases through these
avenues, and the referral rate for illegal possession of firearms is simi-
larly abysmal.  Thus, widening the scope of the firearm ban will do
little to increase its efficiency and effectiveness.  Rather, judicial and
legislative efforts should focus on educating citizens during their form-
ative years about the dangers of abusive relationships, available re-
sources, and characteristics of healthy relationships.  Only by
changing the fundamental misconceptions of society can we perma-
nently end domestic violence.
Nonetheless, the reality remains that Castleman is precedent ap-
plicable in all fifty states.  In light of this, it is critical that prosecutors
and defense attorneys realize the negotiating power they possess at
the bargaining table and strategize the most efficient presentation of
their arguments.  Prosecutors should concentrate on ensuring the
charging documents explicitly set forth the facts and corresponding
statutory elements relied upon in charging the defendant.  These doc-
uments should highlight the domestic relationship between the defen-
dant and victim, and espouse a purposeful or intentional mens rea.  In
contrast, defense attorneys should challenge the prosecutor’s asser-
tion of a domestic relationship where applicable, and offer evidence of
a lesser mens rea—such as recklessness—that does not fall within the
scope of the firearms ban.  These suggestions serve to more efficiently
hone the plea bargaining discussions, and prosecutors should not al-
low defendants to escape from the federal firearm ban simply to expe-
ditiously move cases through the system.  Rather, to give domestic
violence victims the best chance of survival, prosecutors must remain
dedicated to trying these cases and securing the most appropriate out-
comes for victims.
While it is ultimately unlikely that Castleman will appreciably re-
duce domestic violence, it has nonetheless successfully drawn national
attention to the issue of abuse.  Such press coverage combined with
high-profile domestic violence cases has subjected domestic abuse to
well-deserved public scrutiny.  By helping to remove domestic violence
from the private sphere, Castleman may serve as a catalyst in trans-
forming underlying societal perceptions of domestic abuse.  For the
time being, however, the effect of Castleman on the lives of everyday
victims remains uncertain.
